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AUTOMATED THEOREM PROVING AND 
LOGIC PROGRAMMING: A NATURAL SYMBIOSIS~+ 
LARRY WOS AND WILLL4M McCUNE 
D We present a detailed review of the elements of automated theorem 
proving, emphasizing certain aspects of especial interest to the logic 
programming community. In particular, we focus heavily on how an 
automated theorem-proving program can treat equality in a natural and 
yet effective manner, and how such a program can use strategy to control 
its reasoning in a sophisticated fashion. With the objective of significantly 
increasing the scope of logic programming, perhaps some unusually inven- 
tive researcher can adapt various procedures we review in this article, and 
adapt them in a way that preserves most of the speed offered by logic 
programming. In turn, although our expertise rests far more in automated 
theorem proving, we include certain observations concerning the value of 
logic programming to automated theorem proving in general. In other 
words, a natural symbiosis between automated theorem proving and logic 
programming exists, which nicely completes the circle, since logic pro- 
gramming was born of automated theorem proving. a 
1. MOTIVATION 
Occasionally one discovers that two fields, with apparently widely separate aims, in 
fact offer each other useful elements of theory and powerful techniques of 
implementation. In other words, a natural symbiosis exists. The two fields we have 
in mind are automated theorem proving and logic programming. 
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2 LARRY WOS AND WILLIAM MCCUNE 
At the most general level, the natural symbiosis between automated theorem 
proving and logic programming rests with three factors. 
(1) 
(2) 
(31 
Historically, the study of logic programming stems from the study of 
automated theorem proving, especially from the research of the early 1960s. 
After approximately twenty-five years, automated theorem proving can 
again play an important role for logic programming by offering what is 
needed to address two important aspects, that focusing on the effective 
treatment of equality, and that focusing on the sophisticated use of a variety 
of strategies. 
Logic programming can in turn offer to automated theorem proving imple- 
mentation techniques to sharply reduce the CPU time required to complete 
assignments. 
Although we leave a direct treatment of the first factor to various authors (see, in 
particular, the informative article by Elcock [9]>, we do provide in Section 2 a 
review of automated theorem proving. A reading of the review may complete one’s 
understanding of the roots of logic programming. Indeed, with-binary resolution 
[26] (Section 2.2.1) as the basis, logic programming in the obvious sense is born of 
theorem proving. 
Of more immediate and practical value is our treatment of the second and third 
factors just cited. In particular, we provide solutions for the problems of how to 
effectively cope with equality (Sections 2.2.2 and 2.4) and how to materially 
broaden the scope of logic programming by using more powerful strategies 
(Section 2.3). To complete the picture, we discuss in some detail where the 
advances in logic programming will benefit automated theorem proving. In short, 
we show why the term symbiosis is appropriate and why-for some-symbiosis is 
the perfect term. 
Both automated theorem proving and logic programming are empirical sciences, 
equally dependent on theory, implementation, and application. In addition, and 
perhaps more important, both fields are primarily interested in logical reasoning. 
And yet, from a global perspective, an essential difference exists between the two 
fields (see Section 3). Automated theorem proving is oriented to logical reasoning 
that might be termed unfocused and unalgorithmic-to borrow from our colleague 
Ross Overbeek-while logic programming is oriented toward focused and algorith- 
mic reasoning. Indeed, the former is concerned with general-purpose and often 
deep reasoning systems, while the latter is concerned (with certain exceptions) with 
programming languages and far less deep reasoning. Among the exceptions are the 
applications of logic programming to deductive databases, expert systems, and 
theorem proving-applications that obviously can require deep reasoning. 
Especially, but not exclusively, for researchers interested in such applications, 
we shall show why the use of some version of the procedures that are so vital to 
automated theorem proving and that we discuss in Section 2 is indispensable. 
Indeed, the greater the depth of reasoning that is desired, the greater the need for 
the use of techniques like those employed in automated theorem proving. 
Of course, logic programming does offer excellent features for symbolic manipu- 
lation, but-and here we have an issue that we address more fully in Sections 2 
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and 5-far more is needed to provide a firm foundation on which to build a 
deductive system for first-order logic, with or without equality. One of the most 
important features that are needed for effective automated theorem proving but 
that are lacking in logic programming as currently defined is the heavy use of 
different types of strategy, a fact that is often overlooked by researchers who wish 
to rely almost solely on logic programming for building a powerful theorem prover. 
Despite these differences, each field offers the other important benefits (Section 
4). To see that this view is shared by members of the logic programming commu- 
nity, we quote from F. Pereira’s article 1231: 
As researchers in automated deduction come up with new deductive procedures and 
strategies that happen to fit the requirements of logic programming, in equality reasoning 
for example, the generality of the idea of logic programming is widened; and conversely, 
developments in logic programming-as, for example, the efficient implementation tech- 
niques for Prolog-can be generalized to help automated deduction. 
The latter has already occurred, as evidenced in the work of Overbeek and his 
colleagues [5] and the work of Stickel[29]; the time for the former to occur is now. 
Appropriately, our explicit objective is to encourage researchers to adapt 
features from automated theorem proving to extend the usefulness and increase 
the power of logic programming. Among the features to adapt are an effective 
built-in treatment of equality and, more important, a sophisticated use of semanti- 
cally oriented strategy. Indeed, that is the nature of the suggestions we make 
throughout this article-to add to, not to replace, the features of logic program- 
ming. Of course, because we are still fascinated with automated theorem proving 
even after more than twenty-five years of research, we also have the implicit and 
not so secret goal of acquainting (or, for those who already have some knowledge, 
more fully acquainting) members of the logic programming community with the 
elements of automated theorem proving. 
The main reason for pursuing the explicit objective of encouraging the recom- 
mended research rests with the recognition that the adaptation of procedures from 
one field to another often results in important insights, extensions, and improve- 
ments for both fields. Should such occur, we would have a beautiful example of 
ideas borrowed by one field from another, followed by a return with interest-from 
automated theorem proving to logic programming and back. The benefits for the 
logic programmer in studying the elements of automated theorem proving rest with 
the insight gained from reviewing the historical connection of the two fields and 
with the increased familiarity with (possibly new) concepts that merit adaptation. 
With regard to how one might make the desired adaptations, we can only 
suggest he merest beginning. Specifically, one might begin by closely examining 
the elements that appear to provide the keys to the successes for automated 
theorem proving, at least the successes reported here (Section 1.2.1). One of the 
keys to much of the success of the researchers at Argonne National Laboratory 
rests with the natural and yet effective way in which equality is treated. Part of that 
treatment rests with the use of an inference rule (paramodulation [25,39]) that 
enables a reasoning program to treat equality as if it were “understood”. By using 
paramodulation, a program can reason directly deep within an expression, making 
the desired substitutions in a single step without need of the usual axioms for 
equality (Section 2.2.2). Perhaps some enterprising researcher can extend logic 
programming by adapting paramodulation in an effective manner. 
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For a second example of how logic programming might be extended, perhaps a 
way can be found to use demodulation [41], a procedure for automatically canoni- 
calizing expressions by applying the appropriate equalities as rewrite rules. The use 
of demodulation, like the use of paramodulation, sharply increases the power of 
automated theorem-proving programs. Their use by logic programming might 
markedly increase the usefulness of the corresponding programs. In Sections 2.2.2 
and 2.4, we provide the details to enable one to understand more fully why our 
built-in treatment of equality affects the performance of a theorem-proving pro- 
gram so dramatically. 
With regard to how one might begin the adaptation of the types of strategy used 
in automated theorem proving-strategy to restrict and also strategy to direct a 
program’s reasoning-one might start by examining the material of Section 2.3, 
where we discuss the current use by logic programming of a limited form of the sef 
of support strategy [40]. That the set of support strategy, which plays such a vital 
role in automated theorem proving, also plays an important role in logic program- 
ming may come as a surprise to many researchers. To aid the suggested research, 
we also discuss in Section 2.3 how the use of this semantically oriented strategy 
might be profitably extended. By extending the way in which the set of support 
strategy is used, logic programming can offer the user the opportunity of having 
the corresponding program reason recursively from just those statements that 
should be the focus of attention. Even more than an effective treatment of 
equality, a greatly expanded use of strategy will materially increase the power and 
usefulness of logic programming. 
If, in addition, someone finds a means to give logic programming access to the 
weighting strategy [17] (Section 2.3 below) for directing the reasoning and access to 
subsumption [26] (Section 2.5 below) for substantially reducing the paths to explore 
in search of a desired answer, then logic programming will have taken advantage of 
much of what automated theorem proving has to offer. On the other hand, without 
employing strikingly more powerful strategy than that typically found in logic 
programming, hard problems, especially interesting theorems from mathematics 
and logic, will in general be out of reach. In particular, to have the power to prove 
even fairly difficult theorems, an automated theorem-proving program based on 
logic programming will require the incorporation of semantically oriented strategy. 
Postponing the presentation of the details and the discussion of additional 
suggestions to later sections, let us immediately focus on our qualifications and 
general outlook. 
1.1. Our General Outlook 
To remove all doubts regarding our placement of automated theorem proving 
before logic programming in the title of this article, we note that our expertise lies 
in the field of automated theorem proving and not in logic programming. Indeed, 
the serious study at Argonne National Laboratory of the possibility of automating 
theorem proving began in 1963, and has continued without a break since then. We 
are deeply engrossed in that study and, as is so evident throughout this article, 
fascinated with the prospects and results. Therefore-predictably-this article will 
feature automated theorem proving far more than it does logic programming. 
Nevertheless, from various discussions with colleagues, we have learned enough to 
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permit us to comment on both fields, and to focus on the potential value each has 
for the other. 
We view logic programming as “the study and use of carefully controlled 
deductive procedures as computing mechanisms” [23]. We also agree with 
F. Pereira [22] that the restriction to Horn clauses (clauses containing at most one 
positive literal) can be worse than an inconvenience. Fortunately, the recognition 
of that fact by various members of the logic-programming community has in fact 
led to studies focusing on dialects that are not restricted to the use of Horn 
clauses. Nevertheless, although we do not consider logic programming as identified 
with any of its incarnations such as PROLOG, many of our remarks are oriented 
toward PROLOG and PROLOG-like systems. Similarly, although we do not 
consider all of automated theorem proving to be identified with the approach 
taken at Argonne National Laboratory, nevertheless many of our remarks are 
oriented toward automated theorem-proving programs designed and implemented 
by researchers at this laboratory: programs such as AURA 1281, ITP [l&161, and 
OTTER [18]. 
Despite the successes of and our attachment to the Argonne approach, we 
openly recognize various formidable obstacles to overcome and research problems 
to solve [35]. A strategy to sharply curtail the fecundity of paramodulation is 
needed. A strategy that recursively extends the power of the set of support strategy 
would be welcomed. A more effective treatment of set theory is required. We have 
virtually no idea of what to do about definition expansion and contraction. Our 
programs as yet do not offer induction. 
More general, and common to the cited obstacles and others not mentioned 
here, is the obstacle of CPU time. The recognition of this obstacle of execution 
speed is, of course, one of the key factors in motivating various studies in logic 
programming. In particular, the desire to sharply reduce this obstacle may be the 
main cause for the interest in theorem-proving programs based on logic-program- 
ming technology. Unfortunately, that approach to the automation of theorem 
proving merely replaces one obstacle, CPU time, by another, inaccessibility to 
retained information. Of course, one might say that such inaccessibility is not an 
obstacle; rather, it is the key to the power offered by logic programming. We shall 
discuss in Section 2 why such an assertion misses the point, why the retention of 
information is essential-at least when the application focuses on solving hard 
problems or proving even moderately interesting theorems. For such applications, 
the need for information retention rests in part with the fact that a program 
cannot afford to continually rediscover key lemmas, facts, and relationships. 
For a taste of what is to be discussed regarding this need, we note that, without 
the retention of some intermediate information, an attempt at solving a hard 
problem will ordinarily lead to the pursuit of an inordinately large number of 
unprofitable paths. In contrast, the retention of information gives the program 
access to the use of demodulation, subsumption, and powerful strategies, with the 
result that many of those unprofitable paths are never considered. Naturally, the 
key question to answer focuses on the type of information to retain, which is one of 
the reasons we discuss in Section 2.2.3 linked inference and its possible implemen- 
tation based on adapting techniques from logic programming. 
Summarizing, especially (but not exclusively) if the goal is to rely on logic 
programming to solve even harder problems, one might study our case for 
information retention, our treatment of equality, and, most important, our use of 
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strategy. Such a study, even if not completely persuasive, may lead to the insights 
needed to extend logic programming in important ways. Of course, we believe we 
have found the best path to pursue, no doubt greatly influenced by our successful 
use of various automated theorem-proving programs. Even if we are in error, we 
can quickly and easily present a number of causes for optimism. 
1.2. Causes for Optimism 
To set the stage for the material covered in the succeeding sections, let us briefly 
persent our current position and prepare one for the obvious optimism (and 
sometimes wild excitement) that pervades this article. At the top level, although 
other factors exist, our optimism rest chiefly on 
(1) the successes-by relying heavily on a computer program that reasons 
logically-with answering open questions and verifying computer programs; 
(2) the availability of portable theorem-proving programs-some of which are 
in the public domain-that offer impressive power and, if run on a personal 
computer, offer enough power to solve small problems; 
(3) the sharp increase in the willingness-often eagerness-of researchers to 
experiment; and 
(4) access to a variety of computers that rely on parallel processing, and the 
significance of the advances occurring now in automated theorem proving 
and in logic programming. 
Keeping in mind that advances in both automated theorem proving and logic 
programming rely equally on developments in theory, implementation, and appli- 
cation, let us immediately focus, in the order given, on the four causes for our 
optimism and excitement. 
1.2.1. Answering Open Questions and Verifying Computer Programs. Rather than 
a full understanding of the various successes, the nature of each achievement is the 
key for this diverse audience. Therefore, since the details are available elsewhere, 
we shall-in all but the case focusing on combinatory logic-simply touch on the 
open questions that have been answered and the computer programs that have 
been verified. 
The significance of answering open questions with the assistance of an auto- 
mated theorem-proving program rests with the fact that, ordinarily, such questions 
can be answered only by an expert. Therefore, when we can demonstrate that a 
computer program played an important role, we have strong evidence that such a 
program can reason -not only logically, but very effectively. The achievement 
becomes even more impressive when one realizes that so eminent a logician as 
Lukasiewicz asserted in 1948 that a formalized proof cannot be “discovered 
mechanically”, but can only be “checked mechanically” 1141. 
In contrast, the significance of verifying computer programs with the aid of an 
automated theorem-proving program rests with the importance of knowing that 
computer programs do in fact perform as they are intended to perform. Many 
well-known researchers still consider this activity-despite the existing achieve- 
ments-to be essentially doomed. In fact, many well-known researchers consider 
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the activity of proving theorems with a computer also to be doomed. The next few 
years will prove both views to be even more in error. We say “even more in error” 
because of the following evidence. 
In 1967, an automated theorem-proving program made its first contribution to 
mathematics: SAM’s lemma was proved. Next, although the effort was spread over 
an entire decade (starting in 19771, a number of open questions were answered, 
and answered with substantial assistance from an automated theorem-proving 
program, The first of those questions was taken from ternary Boolean algebra. The 
question focuses on the possible independence of each of the first three axioms for 
such an algebra. This question offered an important degree of piquancy in that it 
was posed by A. A. Grau, who invented ternary Boolean algebra. With S. Winker’s 
formulation of a technique for generating models with a theorem-proving program 
[31], proofs of the independence of each of the three axioms were obtained. 
Of those answered in the period beginning in 1977, the second open question 
focuses on finite semigroups. The question, posed by the algebraist I. J. Kaplansky, 
asks about the existence of a finite semigroup that admits, in a nontrivial way, one 
type of mapping but avoids another type. By finding a semigroup of order 83 
(containing 83 elements) a theorem-proving program answered the question in the 
affirmative. To do so, the program was instructed to cope with the problem of 
studying generators and relations [33], rather than attempting to employ a brute- 
force method. A brute-force approach was untenable because there exist more 
than 800,000 semigroups of order 7. The approach that succeeded did not take 
advantage of any expertise in the particular area of mathematics from which the 
problem was selected; the researchers tudying the problem had none. 
The third open question was taken from an area of logic known as equivalential 
calculus. The question, brought to our attention by the logician J. Kalman, asks if 
any of seven given formulas is strong enough to serve by itself as an axiom for the 
entire calculus. An automated theorem-proving program provided invaluable assis- 
tance in proving that five of the seven are too weak, where the proof rests on a 
total characterization of the theorems that can be deduced from each of the 
five. To obtain the characterizations, the program employed a new methodology 
based on the use of schemata 1431. The same program proved-contrary to 
conjecture-that the other two formulas are each strong enough to serve as a 
single axiom. 
Before completing our discussion of open questions that were answered with 
the assistance of a theorem-proving program, let us pause to focus on the use of 
such a program to verify some given computer program. We take this detour 
because the final questions to be discussed are also relevant to programming 
languages, at least in a distant sense. To define program verification, we quote 
Boyer and Moore, from their contribution to the first issue of the Journal of 
Automated Reasoning [4]: “Computer programs may be regarded as formal mathe- 
matical objects whose properties are subject to mathematical proof. Program 
verification is the use of formal, mathematical techniques to debug software and 
software specifications.” (The article from which this quote is taken provides an 
excellent introduction to program verification and other applications of automated 
reasoning.) 
Of the various efforts focusing on using an automated theorem-proving program 
for program verification, that of Boyer and Moore deserves the most acclaim. 
Their approach was to design and implement a program whose main purpose is to 
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verify algorithms and computer code, in contrast to programs designed to be 
general-purpose. They refer to their program as a theorem prover, simply because 
its use is based on proving one theorem after another. The theorems submitted to 
the Boyer-Moore program [2] are obtained from the attempt to prove that some 
given algorithm fulfills its intended purpose or from the attempt to prove that 
some given computer program satisfies the claims made for it. As the following list 
of successes hows, Boyer and Moore have indeed designed a powerful program, a 
program that demonstrates that automated theorem-proving can be most useful for 
program verification. Among the program’s successes are proofs of 
the invertibility of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman public-key encryption algorithm 
[31; 
the soundness and completeness of a propositional-calculus decision procedure; 
the soundness of an arithmetic simplifier; 
the termination of Takeuchi’s function; 
the correctness of many elementary list and tree-processing functions; 
the properties of many recursive functions; and 
the verification conditions for various small FORTRAN programs, including a fast 
string-searching algorithm, an integer square-root algorithm using Newton’s 
method, and a linear-time majority-vote algorithm. 
Significantly larger programs have been verified with an automated theorem- 
proving program. For example, the Stanford Verifier by Luckham and his students 
at Stanford University [ll] was used to verify a 3000-line PASCAL compiler, and the 
Gypsy Verification Environment (GVE) by Good [lo] was used to verify a 4200-line 
communications interface to a computer network. For the latter effort, some 2600 
verification conditions were proved, using a theorem prover adapted from one by 
Bledsoe [l]. 
We close this discussion on the application of automated theorem-proving to 
program verification with one final citation. The success under consideration- 
obtained by Smith, Wojcik, Chisholm, and Kljaich [6,7,12,13]-concerns the 
verification of software, hardware, and their interface in a system designed by 
Draper Laboratories to replace certain failing sensors in a nuclear reactor at 
Argonne National Laboratory. The reactor in question was designed in the later 
1950s with the expectation of being used for approximately fifteen years, and 
therefore the fact that its sensors are failing is no surprise. Since the reactor still 
provides much useful data, the software/hardware replacement system merits 
serious study. The automated theorem-proving program ITP [15,16] played the key 
role in the verification of the fault-tolerant (replacement) system designed by 
Draper. In particular, 1-m proved that the appropriate properties are present in the 
Draper system; in addition, by examining the work performed by that reasoning 
program, researchers found important simplifications that could be made to the 
design of the system. The success of Smith and his colleagues is, in an obvious 
sense, one of the best examples of the use of an automated reasoning program to 
verify the claims made, at the highest level, for a system. 
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We now return to the topic of answering open questions with the assistance of 
an automated theorem-proving program; our focus here is on combinatory logic. 
This topic nicely combines aspects of pure mathematics and logic with the practical 
objective of producing programs free of bugs. Researchers (for example, Turner 
[30]) are most interested in compiling high-level applicative languages into combi- 
nators-combinators that are the machine instructions executed by the computer 
(see Sections 2.4 and 5 for examples of combinators and how they behave); in fact, 
such computers have been designed and built. In our studies of combinatory logic, 
we have been able to answer questions concerning the presence or absence, for 
some given set of combinators, of what are called the weak and the strong 
fixed-point properties (see Section 5 for their definitions). To appreciate the 
difficulty of such questions, one might try to answer the first two challenge 
questions we pose at the beginning of Section 5. 
We were able to answer those questions and many other similar questions, and 
the key is the use of our new global strategy, called the kernel strategy [37], for 
systematically searching for fixed-point combinators. That success still startles us, 
especially in that it marks a singular event for automated theorem proving. In 
particular, there now exists an area (the study of the presence or absence of either 
fixed-point property) in a deep field (combinatory logic) such that randomly 
selected questions can be quickly answered with a high probability by submitting 
them to a theorem-proving program. The kernel strategy has proved to be very 
powerful, especially when applied by our recently designed automated theorem- 
proving program OTTER [18]-which brings us naturally to the topic of the next 
section, portable automated theorem-proving programs. 
1.2.2. Portable Automated Theorem-Proving Programs. Each of the two fields, 
automated theorem proving and logic programming, is empirical in nature. There- 
fore, for the needed advances to occur, experimentation is essential. Indeed, the 
likelihood and the frequency of significant advances are each directly dependent 
on the amount of experimentation. As an illustration from a totally unrelated field, 
one can show that the rapid progress made in the area of linear algebra resulted 
directly from numerous experiments by various researchers with different com- 
puter programs. 
Unfortunately, the comparable and needed amount of experimentation did not 
occur in the first twenty years of automated theorem proving. Although suspect, 
one reason that was frequently given was the lack of access to a theorem-proving 
program. The lack no longer exists. Indeed, we know of three automated 
theorem-proving programs that are portable and in the public domain. 
For program verification, one can use the Boyer-Moore theorem-proving pro- 
gram [2]. The program, written in LISP, relies heavily on the use of induction and is 
specifically designed to verify the correctness of computer programs and algo- 
rithms. One can obtain the program by electronic mail. For the details, one should 
write by electronic mail to boy e r 61 c s . u t e x a s . e d u or by ordinary mail to the 
Department of Computer Sciences of the University of Texas. 
The second theorem-proving program, ITP [15,16], is not tailored to any specific 
application. This program, written in PASCAL, permits one to use it in interactive or 
in batch mode. Use of ITP gives one access to a wide variety of inference rules and 
strategies-some of which we shall discuss in Section 2-but this program does 
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not offer induction. VAX/UNIX, VAX/VMS, and IBM/cMs versions are available 
by contacting either of the following two sources: 
Numerical Algorithms Group, Inc. 
Suite 200 
1400 Opus Place 
Downers Grove, IL 60515-5702 
Phone: (708) 971-2337 
Fax: (708) 971-2706 
National Energy Software Center 
Argonne National Laboratory 
Argonne, IL 60439 
Phone: (708) 972-7172 
The third portable automated theorem-proving program of interest is the very 
recently designed program OCR [18]. OTTER, written in c, is a general-purpose 
theorem-proving program. Like ITP, it offers a wide range of inference rules and 
strategies, but does not offer induction. Among all of the theorem-proving pro- 
grams of which we know, this new program runs faster than all but AURA [281; 
AURA is faster at applying hyperresolution, UR-resolution, and nonunit subsump- 
tion, and OVER is faster at applying paramodulation, demodulation, and forward 
unit subsumption. Perhaps more significant-since experimentation of many types 
by many people is so Valuable-OlTER can be used with a personal computer. 
Currently, for the details for obtaining a copy of OTTER, one should contact 
William McCune, by electronic mail at m c c u n e @ m c s . a n 1 . g o v, or by ordinary 
mail in the Mathematics and Computer Science Division at Argonne National 
Laboratory. However, very shortly, one will be able to obtain a copy of O-ITER from 
either of the sources cited for ITP. 
1.2.3. Researchers and Their Willingness to Experiment. The field of automated 
theorem proving and the field of logic programming are now beginning to emerge 
as significant areas of study and application, and that emergence can be traced 
directly to the new attitude toward experimentation. Specifically, researchers are 
far more willing now than ever before to test their ideas with actual problems and 
with existing computer programs. Further, when the appropriate computer pro- 
gram or routine is unavailable, researchers are more willing, and even eager, to 
design and implement what is needed than they were in the preceding many years. 
In other words, until recently, the field of automated theorem proving suffered 
from an unwillingness to experiment. We are certain that this lack of a desire to 
test ideas with an existing program or-when such a program was not 
available-resistance to writing such a program was far less common in logic 
programming. Nevertheless, perhaps the research in logic programming was ham- 
pered by a related phenomenon-an unfamiliarity with what has been occurring in 
automated theorem proving. If that is the case, then this article may serve in part 
as an antidote. 
Indeed, by being presented with new ideas or variations on old ideas, those 
interested in logic programming may-at least catalytically-be stimulated to 
enhance existing programs or, even better, design and implement even more 
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powerful and versatile ones than now exist. In particular, an examination of the 
material presented in Section 2, where we review the elements of automated 
theorem proving, may permit some researcher to adapt one or more of those 
elements to logic programming. Although we suspect that such an adaptation 
presents a formidable challenge, we cannot help but wonder what might result. 
Of course, one of the key questions focuses on timing, on when to consider 
attempting to make the suggested adaptations. How astute F. Pereira was when he 
commented: “It is fortunate that the originators of logic programming had the 
courage to ditch equality in developing the concepts and techniques of logic 
programming. . . premature concern with generality would have prevented the 
development of the very efficient implementations that characterize current logic 
programming practice” [231! 
But Pereira was accurately discussing logic programming in its beginning, and 
we are focusing on 1989 and what is possible now. Therefore, especially in view of 
the high quality of current research in logic programming, perhaps the field is 
ready and able to employ more fully some of the features offered by the more 
powerful automated theorem-proving programs. In particular, as in its beginning, 
perhaps logic programming is ready to experiment heavily with techniques cur- 
rently used in automated theorem proving: ready to experiment with incorporating 
the use of strategy far more powerful than currently used and with incorporating a 
more practical treatment of equality. The corresponding experiments would be 
most intriguing to us. 
Because we prefer to see and perhaps use the results of those experiments 
sooner rather than later, the prudent course of action is to attempt to add to the 
current willingness and eagerness to experiment, and even attempt to increase the 
number of researchers involved in experimentation. In the remainder of this 
section, therefore, let us focus on the need for experimentation and also on some 
of the advances that have occurred directly because of experimentation. 
With regard to the need for experimentation (recognizing that we are repeating 
ourselves, but also believing that this point deserves emphasis), most important of 
all, automated theorem proving and logic programming are each empirical sci- 
ences. Specifically, although advances in theory and advances in implementation 
play an equal and vital role-since the objective of both fields is that of diverse 
application-everything must be thoroughly tested, and tested by numerous users. 
The need for thorough testing is obvious. The need for numerous users rests with 
the fact that it is far too easy to develop a bias toward some approach. 
For one of the less publicized examples of a bias that can be present, one can 
easily focus on questions, problems, or theorems from one area, not realizing that 
such a focus may distort one’s evaluation. Equally-and also not discussed 
frequently-one can be inordinately convinced of the power of an approach by its 
success with simple problems or theorems. For an example of a simple theorem, 
one can study the theorem from group theory that asserts that the group is 
commutative whenever the square of every element x is the identity. For an 
example of a theorem that is not simple or easy to prove, one might study the 
commutator theorem of group theory (see Section 2.61, which we pose as a 
challenge problem in Section 1.3. In contrast to testing an idea by a few individu- 
als, if many individuals experiment with an idea-one of theory, implementation, 
or application-then the likelihood of a distortion occurring is sharply reduced. 
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With regard to advances in automated theorem proving that can be traced 
directly to experimentation, three that might be useful to logic programming 
immediately come to mind. Although we shall highlight these three in Section 2, 
let us quickly focus on each here. First, the set of support strategy (see Section 2.3) 
was discovered because of experiments focusing on theorems from group theory, 
experiments designed and implemented to test the power of a program designed in 
the early 1960s by D. Carson of Argonne National Laboratory; the story of its 
discovery is given in Chapter 2 of [35]. As we shall learn, the object of the set of 
support strategy is to restrict the reasoning to information that is closely connected 
to the specific question under investigation. In a sense that we shall discuss in 
Section 2.3, logic programming employs a very restricted version of this strategy. 
The second advance resulting from experimentation was the discovery of the 
procedure called demodulation (see Section 2.4). That procedure was formulated 
to cope with the disappointing performance of a later version of the Argonne 
program when that program was asked to prove a simple lemma in number theory; 
see Chapter 2 of [35]. The object of demodulation is to rewrite information into a 
canonical form. We shall discuss in Section 2.2.3 the possible usefulness of this 
procedure to logic programming. 
The third advance that can be traced to experimentation is the formulation of 
the weighting strategy (see Section 2.3) [17]. This contribution of Overbeek resulted 
from his attempts to have his theorem-proving program find a proof of the 
commutator theorem. From our viewpoint, the object of the weighting strategy is 
mainly to enable the user to give a program hints about which information is 
significant and should therefore be keyed upon, and which is insignificant and 
should therefore be discarded. From Overbeek’s viewpoint, the object of weighting 
is to circumscribe the terms that are conjectured to be relevant. We shall discuss in 
Section 4 the possible usefulness to logic programming of both the weighting and 
the set of support strategy. 
With virtually no subtlety, we are suggesting that experimentation must be 
encouraged in as many ways as one can, and by as many people as one can interest. 
Fortunately-and here we again visit one of the factors that make us so optimistic 
-the current group of researchers is willing and, often, eager to experiment. 
Although the explanation for this dramatic change might rest with the simple fact 
that many people now conducting research have grown up with computers, we 
prefer to believe that the explanation rests with an understanding of the impor- 
tance of experimentation. 
1.2.4. Recent Advances. With the advent of parallel processing, the future looks 
even more enticing, and the opportunities are many. One prediction asserts that, 
by 1993, the Hypercube will offer 1024 processors, each of which will deliver 100 
MIPS-and in parallel. Parallel-processing automated theorem-proving programs 
may be drawing 10,000 significant conclusions per second of CPU time; 10 MIPS 
may be required to draw a significant conclusion. 
To fully grasp the importance of such an achievement, one might note that 
drawing a significant conclusion is equivalent o many LIPS (logical inferences per 
second). It would be incorrect to say that logic programming can already draw 
10,000 conclusions a second, for LIPS should not be confused with conclusions per 
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second. Indeed, one “logical inference” for logic programming is somewhat 
equivalent o an attempt at one successful application of binary resolution, and it is 
difficult for a mathematician or logician to consider, for example, the concatena- 
tion of two lists as drawing many conclusions. Therefore, the term LIPS is a rather 
unfortunate choice, at least for mathematicians and logicians and the like. 
With the sharp increase in the rate of conclusion drawing that results from the 
use of parallelism, with the advances that we expect in logic programming that also 
depend on parallel processing, and with the already existing evidence that auto- 
mated theorem proving can borrow from logic programming (see Section 41, one 
can easily understand why access to this new type of computer produces so much 
optimism in us. 
In addition to the increase in speed directly resulting from the use of parallel 
processing, even greater speed may be possible, depending on the results of certain 
research now in progress in logic programming-especially that under the aegis of 
the Gigalips project. We already have excellent examples of the value for auto- 
mated theorem proving of some of the advances in logic programming. In the new 
program OTTER, the demodulation procedure (discussed in Section 2.4) for rewrit- 
ing information into a canonical form employs techniques borrowed from logic 
programming. We shall give some of the pertinent details in Section 4 of this 
article. For a second example, an implementation of linked inference, which we 
shall introduce and discuss in some detail in Section 2.2.3, would also benefit from 
the use of certain techniques whose nature is reminiscent of logic programming. 
For two other important advances, one might study the excellent research that 
focuses on compiling logic programs into efficient code, and also study the work of 
Overbeek and his colleagues [51 focusing on the use of PROLOG technology to 
implement a parallel-processing version of the inference rule hyperresolution. 
With regard to the former, in some unpublished experiments we have obtained 
impressive speed by compiling demodulators (see Section 2.4 for a discussion of 
that concept), an approach originating directly in the success in compiling logic- 
programming code. With regard to the latter, the full value of using logic 
programming technology for aspects of automated theorem proving must wait 
some years, but such use already appears to offer a great deal for an implementa- 
tion of linked inference rules. 
1.3. A Challenge and a Caveat 
For those researchers who naturally question our enthusiasm concerning the 
various procedures on which a number of theorem-proving programs rest, we offer 
the following challenge problem. The challenge asks one to prove a theorem, 
called the commutator theorem (see Section 2.6 for more details), from abstract 
algebra, but, most important, to prove it strictly by means of logic programming. In 
particular, one is asked to seek a proof without using paramodulation, demodula- 
tion, subsumption, and weighting. The theorem to prove asserts that if the cube of 
every element x in the group is the identity e, then [[x, y], y] = e for all x and y, 
where the commutator [x, y] of any two elements x and y of a group is the 
product of X, y, the inverse of X, and the inverse of y. 
Obtaining a proof of this theorem without using the key procedures discussed in 
Section 2 should provide a substantial challenge. Among the benefits that will 
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accrue to one who accepts the challenge are a deeper understanding and apprecia- 
tion of why automated theorem proving requires the use of such complicated 
procedures as it relies upon and, perhaps, an impetus to attempt to adapt those 
same procedures for logic programming. To aid the reader in assessing progress in 
an attempt to meet the challenge, in Section 2.6 we supply two proofs of the 
commutator theorem. 
Let us now turn to a review of automated theorem proving. For that review, 
although various paradigms exist for this field, we focus on that based on the use of 
clause language (see Section 2.1) and-in many respects-focus heavily on how we 
at Argonne treat automated theorem proving. We note that one of the authors 
(Was) strongly favors the paradigm presented in Section 2 because the lack of 
richness of the clause language-which is considered a weakness by some-con- 
tributes, in his view, to a sharp increase in the probability of formulating effective 
inference rules and powerful strategies to control their application. We also note 
that, after discussing for a number of years the various approaches to automated 
theorem proving, it is Wos’s opinion that the paradigm of Section 2 is far more 
promising than the paradigms based on natural deduction, connection graphs, logic 
programming, and a nonclausal approach. Indeed, we conjecture that far more has 
been accomplished within the clause paradigm than within any other. 
Therefore, as one reads Section 2, one might keep in mind that, although what 
we discuss applies to various paradigms for the automation of theorem proving and 
hence is not limited to our approach to automated theorem proving, the discussion 
is slanted in that direction. During that reading, one might also keep in mind the 
already discussed essential difference between automated theorem proving and 
logic programming; the former is oriented toward unalgorithmic reasoning and the 
latter toward algorithmic. Nevertheless, as we shall espouse-especially in Section 
4-a natural symbiosis exists between the two fields. 
2. A REVIEW OF AUTOMATED THEOREM PROVING 
As one reads this rather extensive review of automated theorem proving, one may 
see many connections with logic programming; a more complete treatment of the 
larger field-automated reasoning-can be found in [381 or in [351. Indeed, the 
basis for logic programming can be traced to Robinson’s formulation of 
the inference rule binary resolution [26] (see Section 2.2.1 below). Throughout 
the remainder of this article, we shall touch on other connections between logic 
programming and automated theorem proving, and pose questions concerning a 
possible closer connection that could exist between the two fields. 
At the highest level, automated theorem proving-at least the paradigm that is 
our preference-can be viewed as imitating (in certain respects) mathematics by 
beginning its attack on a given question or problem by accruing various lemmas 
and conclusions. By retaining such information, automated theorem proving imme- 
diately departs from the usual practice in logic programming. The motive for 
information retention rests with the notion that, to succeed in answering deep 
questions and solving hard problems, the program cannot afford to continually 
rediscover the needed lemmas, facts, or relationships. The decision to retain 
information-as will become clear in this review-virtually requires the program 
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to rely on a number of procedures that might otherwise be unneeded, procedures 
for canonicalization, for information purging, and for restricting and directing its 
reasoning. However-as we shall suggest-avoiding the retention of information, 
and therefore bypassing the need for the additional procedures, sharply reduces 
the likelihood of success when the assignment concerns deep questions and hard 
problems. 
Since unrestrained accrual of information is almost always doomed to failure, 
the program applies various types of strategy to restrict such accrual. In addition, 
unlike mathematics (since we as yet know of no way to avoid various types of 
redundancy), the theorem-proving program purges conclusions that are captured 
by more general information. Also unlike mathematics, the program applies types 
of reasoning that we would advise no person to apply: reasoning, such as paramod- 
ulation for generalizing equality substitution (see Section 2.2.2) that is tailored to 
the properties of a computer. Finally-as logic programming in effect does-in the 
vast majority of cases, the typical theorem-proving program seeks to prove the 
conjectured theorem by seeking a proof by contradiction. 
If one quickly reviews the preceding remarks, one sees that, although similari- 
ties exist, automated theorem proving does indeed approach problem solving in a 
manner that is distinctly different in many respects from that found in logic 
programming. To gain some insight into why automated theorem proving-at least 
the paradigm that has worked for us-is so successful, to study the precise nature 
of each of its components, and to learn how strong our case for automated 
theorem proving is, let us review the basic elements. 
We shall begin the review by briefly focusing on representation, specifically, on 
the clause language so familiar to researchers in logic programming. We must 
spend a little time on this topic because we observe conventions different from 
those of logic programming. We shall then turn to some of the types of reasoning 
offered by many theorem-proving programs, briefly touching on the inference rule 
binary resolution (already mentioned and familiar to many), heavily focusing on 
puramodulution and its use for “building in equality”, and also heavily focusing on 
linked inference rules and their use for avoiding many trivial intermediate deduc- 
tions. We focus heavily on paramodulation because this inference rule, in our view, 
offers a most attractive approach for coping with equality and all of the attendant 
difficulties. We wonder whether there exists a way to use this inference rule to 
extend the power of logic programming without interfering with its impressive 
efficiency. We focus on linked inference rules because one of them, linked 
hyperresolution, provides-in terms that are used in automated theorem proving 
-a convenient way of discussing the reasoning applied in logic programming. A 
glance at linked inference rules might, at least catalytically, result in some 
interesting developments. 
After completing our discussion of inference rules, we next turn to strategy of 
various kinds. Even more than the treatment of equality, in our view the area of 
automated theorem proving that offers substantial power for logic programming is 
that of strategy. We shall focus on strategies that restrict a program’s reasoning, 
and also on strategies that direct it. It is through the use of strategy that 
automated theorem proving derives much of its power. 
The next topics in our review are demodulation, a procedure for rewriting 
information into a canonical form, and subsumption, a procedure for discarding a 
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particular type of logically weak information. Just as the use of strategy is crucial, a 
program that attempts to answer deep questions or solve hard problems is almost 
always doomed to failure without the use of demodulation. Subsumption, whose 
use is also vital, might at first appear to hold little or no interest for the logic 
programming community. Nevertheless, a discussion of this procedure and its 
relation to theorem-proving programs implemented in the spirit of logic program- 
ming may-at least for some-prove exceedingly provocative. 
To provide at least a taste of all of the key elements of automated theorem 
proving, we close our review with a discussion of proof by contradiction. This topic 
is in an obvious sense very familiar to the experienced researcher in logic 
programming. Nevertheless, certain examples of proof by contradiction might be of 
some interest, especially those focusing on the commutator theorem as an example 
of a rather difficult theorem to prove. Indeed, that theorem exemplifies the various 
points we make in this section, and provides the type of challenge (Section 1.3) 
that might prove stimulating, for consideration of the theorem shows why many of 
the procedures we discuss are needed. To prepare for our treatment of each of the 
specific elements of automated theorem proving, in which we rely mainly on 
examples rather than on formal definitions, let us immediately summarize the 
actions taken by a typical theorem-proving program. 
The fields of mathematics and logic from which a theorem may be taken include 
algebra, geometry, topology, set theory, and combinatory logic. The most widely 
used approach for proving theorems-or for solving any problem or answering any 
question-with a theorem-proving program focuses on searching for a proof by 
contradiction. Therefore, to enable a program using such an approach to attempt 
to prove a proposed theorem of the form if P then Q, ode is required to define the 
field from which the theorem is taken, to give the special hypothesis (which may be 
the empty set) of the theorem, and to assume that the theorem is in fact false. By 
the special hypothesis, we mean that which remains of the if conditions of a 
theorem when one ignores the axioms of the theory from which the theorem is 
taken and also ignores any lemmas that the user supplies. We also use the term 
denial of the conclusion to refer to those statements-or clauses-that arise from 
assuming the theorem false. As we discuss in Section 2.3, the special hypothesis 
and the denial of the conclusion each play an important role in the use of a 
powerful strategy, the set of support strategy. 
To begin its attack on the given problem, the theorem-proving program draws 
conclusions-some of which it retains-by applying one or more sound inference 
rules chosen by the researcher. The retention of conclusions markedly increases 
the effectiveness of a theorem-proving program and also permits one to use such a 
program to explore a new theory, and then display some of the properties of that 
theory. The application of each rule is restricted by one type of strategy and 
directed by another type. When a conclusion is drawn, the program rewrites it into 
a canonical form by applying rules (demodulators [41]) supplied by the researcher 
or discovered by the program. The result is then tested (with the use of subsump- 
tion [26]) to see whether it is a trivial corollary of information the program already 
has, and should therefore be discarded. The result can also be tested-by using 
weighting [171 (see Section 2.3 below&to see whether it satisfies criteria (weights), 
supplied by the researcher, for measuring significance; if the conclusion fails the 
test, it is discarded. As expected, the goal is to deduce some new conclusion that 
THEOREM PROVING AND LOGIC PROGRAMMING 17 
contradicts a conclusion drawn earlier or contradicts some input statement. When 
such a deduction is made, a proof by contradiction has been found, and the 
automated theorem-proving program in use “knows” that the given assignment has 
been completed. 
Using the preceding summary of the program’s actions as an outline for this 
section, let us sample each of the main areas, beginning with representation-a 
discussion of how one specifies the problem to be considered. Of course, for the 
experienced researcher in logic programming, this first topic will be in the main a 
familiar one. 
2. I. Representation 
In this section, we mainly use the notation and conventions employed in the two 
books we recommend for further study [38,351, a notation that is consistent with 
the formal language-the clause language-most commonly used in automated 
theorem proving and so familiar to logic programming. We include some discus- 
sion because our notation and conventions differ from those frequently used in 
logic programming. 
Our conventions require variables to be chosen from among terms whose first 
symbol is one of lowercase u through z (which contrasts with the uppercase 
notation used in various dialects of logic programming). Each variable is implicitly 
universally quantified (meaning “for all”), and each variable is relevant only to the 
clause in which it occurs. Also by convention, functions and constants are (almost 
always) written in lowercase, and relations (predicates) written in uppercase. In 
addition-and this convention is most important-by writing EQUAL for the 
equality relation, our programs are able to treat equality as “understood” or “built 
in”. Finally, the symbol 7 means not, and the symbol I means or. In other words, 
one encounters another notational difference from logic programming, for we 
explicitly use a symbol for logical or and for logical not. As in logic programming, 
existence is not represented with variables; instead, appropriate functions and 
constants are employed. In contrast with logic programming, the logical operator 
and never occurs within a clause. 
Some of the differences between the standard PROLOG notation and that we 
use now in automated theorem proving are captured by the following example: 
grandparent(X, Y 1 :- parent(X, Z), parent(Z, Y 1. 
GRANDPARENTCX, J’) 1 7 PARENT(X, 2) 1 7 PARENT(2, y). 
The first of the two given clauses is in PROLOG notation, and the second is in the 
notation we (usually) employ in automated theorem proving. 
Of course, as is well known, one of the key differences between typical logic 
programming and automated theorem proving is the latter’s use of clauses that 
contain as many positive literals as desired. By not being restricted to the use of 
Horn clauses (clauses containing at most one positive literal), one can rely on a 
more natural representation. In our next example of the notation and conventions 
we use, we shall encounter clauses that are not Horn. It may well be-even though 
we would like to believe otherwise-that the successes of logic programming are 
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so dependent on the restriction to the use of Horn clauses that all other options 
are unacceptable in the vast majority of cases. 
For the final difference between logic programming and automated theorem 
proving, we note that (in the latter) the denial of a theorem might be represented 
with clauses each of which contains positive literals only. Obviously (for logic 
programming) such a clause cannot be used as a goal clause, which can force one 
to use an axiom, for example, as the goal clause. As we comment later, basing a 
search for information entirely on an axiom can be disastrous. Let us now turn to 
more interesting examples. 
To illustrate our notation, to provide an example that might be challenging to 
consider for logic programming, and to exemplify (in Section 2.2) various inference 
rules, let us consider the following theorem from abstract group theory: If a 
subgroup 0 has index 2 in a group G, then 0 is a normal subgroup. (For the 
axioms of a group-first in a notation that avoids in the main the use of equality 
and second in a notation that emphasizes equality-one can turn to the commuta- 
tor theorem in Section 2.6.) By definition, a subgroup 0 has index 2 in the group 
G if and only if G/O (G mod 0) consists of two left cosets, the elements in 0 and 
the elements not in 0. Also by definition, a subgroup 0 is a normal subgroup if 
and only if the product of X, y, and the inverse of x is an element of 0 for all x in 
the group and all y in 0. Where equality is axiomatized rather than built in, the 
following clauses can be used-if one also uses clauses (GT-1) through (GT-17) of 
Section 2.6-to present the theorem under discussion to an automated theorem- 
proving program: 
0 
0 
is a subgroup: 
(SIT-l) O(e) 
(SIT-21 -, O(x) I O(inv(xI) 
(SIT-31 7 O(x)7 O(Y) I 1 P(X,y,z) I O(z) 
has index 2: 
(SIT-41 O(x) I O(y) IP(x,i(X,y),y) 
(SIT-51 O(x) I O(Y) I O(i(x,y)) 
Denial of the conclusion: 
(SIT-61 P(b,inv(a),c) 
(SIT-71 P(a,c,d) 
(SIT-8) O(b) 
(SIT-9) -, O(d) 
For a proof of this theorem in clause notation, see Section 6.1.1 of [35], which 
completes the representational discussion of the index-2 theorem. 
To show how equality can be treated to enable the program to “understand” 
that concept, let us turn to examples from ordinary arithmetic-or, alternatively, 
from group theory written additively. To express the fact that there exists a left 
identity, 
0+x=x 
for all x, we write 
EQUAL( SUlll( 0,X) ,X) 
as the corresponding clause. To express the existence of an additive (right) inverse, 
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for all x there exists a y such that 
x+y=o, 
we write 
EQUAL( SUItl( x,minus( x)) ,o) 
as the clause. 
Having dispensed with representation, let us now turn to the types of reasoning 
that can be offered by an automated theorem-proving program. 
2.2. Inference Rules 
In this subsection, we focus on some of the inference rules that the more versatile 
automated theorem-proving programs offer. We begin with binary resolution [261 
(because researchers in logic programming are so familiar with it, and because it 
plays such an important role for logic programming), UR-resolution [17l, and 
hyperresolution [27]. We next turn to paramodulation [25,39], the inference rule 
that can be used to enable a theorem-proving program to treat equality as if it 
were “understood”. We close this section by focusing on two linked inference 
rules: linked UR-resolution and linked hyperresolution [42]. 
To provide an overall comparison of the inference rules discussed here, we note 
that-in contrast to binary resolution-UR-resolution and hyperresolution can 
each consider simultaneously two or more clauses at a time, provided that certain 
conditions are met. The use of UR-resolution emphasizes the role of unit clauses 
(clauses with one literal), and the use of hyperresolution emphasizes the role of 
positive clauses (clauses without negative literals). Paramodulation-which is the 
best example of a computer-oriented inference rule, and one that a person 
probably should not apply by hand-generalizes the usual notion of equality 
substitution (see the third example in Section 2.2.2) and requires the use of the 
clause 
EQUAL( X , X ) 
for reflexivity, but requires no other clauses for that relation. 
Because of the importance of coping with equality, among the inference rules 
we discuss here, paramodulation may be of greatest interest to logic programming. 
Indeed, to attempt to solve hard problems from mathematics, a program is often 
required to reason within deeply nested expressions, which paramodulation does, 
and does without being forced to process all of the intermediate expressions that 
must be processed when equality is treated with the usual set of axioms. Linked 
UR-resolution and linked hyperresolution-the latter of which will be seen to 
capture the type of reasoning used in logic programming-generalize the corre- 
sponding inference rule, and are designed to avoid deducing certain types of 
intermediate and trivial information. 
2.2.1. Binary Resolution, UR-Resolution, and Hyperresolution. Because an un- 
derstanding of the inference rule paramodulation does not come easily, and 
because we consider a built-in treatment of equality to be crucial for automated 
theorem proving, let us begin by focusing on simpler inference rules. As promised, 
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we can use the theorem that asserts that subgroups of index 2 are normal. For our 
first three examples, we can use the following clauses: 
(SIT-21 7 O(x) I O(inv(x)> 
(SIT-31 1 O(x) I 1 O(y) I 1 P(x,y,z) I O(z) 
(SIT-4) O(x) I O(Y) IP(x,i(x,y),y) 
(SIT-8) O(b) 
(SIT-9) 7 O(d) 
(GT-7) P(x,y,prod(x,y)) 
The last clause is sometimes called the closure axiom, and asserts the totality of 
the function prod. 
As is well known to the people in logic programming, at each step on each path 
designed to solve a subgoal, the reasoning employed by logic programming is in 
effect an attempt to successfully apply a single binary-resolution step. For example, 
by applying binary resolution to clauses (SIT-8) and (SIT-2), we obtain 
0( inv( b)) 
as the conclusion, which would also be obtained by applying UR-resolution or 
hyperresolution to this pair of clauses. 
For a more interesting example of the use of UR-resolution-one that captures 
the spirit of the rule-we simultaneously consider clause (SIT-41 and two copies of 
clause (SIT-9) to obtain 
P( d,i( d,d) ,d) 
as the conclusion. The inference rule UR-resolution considers a nonunit clause 
(the nucleus); with the exception of one literal, it attempts to simultaneously unify 
each of its literals with a unit clause (a satellite) and, if successful, produces a unit 
clause as the conclusion. The use of UR-resolution, therefore, permits the pro- 
gram to deduce a negative unit clause as well as a positive unit clause, and-in 
contrast to hyperresolution-to focus on a set of hypotheses involving more than 
one clause containing negative literals. 
The inference rule hyperresolution considers a nonpositive clause (the nucleus); 
it attempts to simultaneously unify each of its negative literals with a literal in 
positive clause (a satellite) and, if successful, produces a positive clause (possibly 
the empty clause) as the conclusion. For hyperresolution to obtain the conclusion 
P(d,i(d,d),d) from the same hypotheses, two steps would be required. In particu- 
lar-although not in the spirit of hyperresolution, which encourages the deduction 
of clauses some of whose positive literals come from the clause containing the 
negative literals to be removed-the program could first apply the inference rule 
to clauses (SIT-9) and (SIT-4) to obtain 
O(Y) lP(d,i(d,y),y), 
which, with a second application of hyperresolution, would then be used with 
clause (SIT-9) to again reach the conclusion for which UR-resolution required but 
one deduction step. For an application of hyperresolution that is more typical, we 
apply the rule to the simultaneous consideration of clauses (SIT-3), (SIT-8), 
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(SIT-8), and (GT-7) to obtain 
as the conclusion. We note that neither UR-resolution nor hyperresolution, as the 
examples show, is restricted to the consideration of Horn clauses. 
Unless purged with some procedure such as subsumption (see Section 2.5) or 
weighting (see Section 2.31, the cited conclusions would be retained. Retention of 
clauses-as the reader no doubt realizes-is motivated by the desire to use them 
later in the attempt to complete the given assignment, and by the desire to save the 
CPU time, which might be as much as 15 minutes, that would be needed to deduce 
them again. A less obvious motivation for the retention of clauses rests with the 
side effect of avoiding numerous undesirable paths, which we discuss in Section 
2.2.3. The tricky part, as is obvious, is to decide which information to retain and 
which to purge, or treat as implicitly present-an additional topic we address in 
Section 2.2.3 when we discuss linked inference rules. Just in case one is skeptical 
about the need to retain any information versus the desire to save CPU time, we 
suggest hat one examine the commutator theorem from group theory and its two 
proofs, which we give in Section 2.6. 
Of course, to save all conclusions is madness. Indeed, one motivation for using 
hyperresolution or UR-resolution or some linked inference rule is to sharply 
reduce the number of conclusions to be retained. Although hyperresolution, for 
example, can be viewed and programmed as a sequence of binary-resolution steps, 
it can also be programmed-as Overbeek did in AURA [21]-without generating 
any intermediate clauses. In the same sense, linked inference rules can be viewed 
and programmed as a sequence of binary resolution steps, but we are almost 
certain that a far better choice is to borrow from logic programming to implement 
such rules. In other words, we have an excellent example of how logic program- 
ming can be of use to automated theorem proving. For the converse, let us now 
turn to a discussion of an inference rule-paramodulation-whose use directly 
addresses the difficulties presented by equality. 
2.2.2. Paramodulation, Defined with Examples. We now come to one of the two 
areas that we conjecture offers the most for logic programming, one being our 
treatment of the equality relation (see Sections 2.2.2 and 2.4), the other being 
strategy (see Section 2.3). There now appears to be ample evidence that treating 
equality as a built-in concept is far superior to an axiomatic approach. In particu- 
lar, by using paramodulation-which we feature in this section-an automated 
theorem-proving program can reason directly within deeply nested expressions 
rather than touching the various so-called intermediate points. For a trivial 
example, paramodulation can use the fact that a = b to immediately deduce in one 
step that 
Q(f(dhW))) 
from the fact that 
Q(f(dhW)) 
without deducing the intermediate conclusions that would be deduced by applying 
the appropriate axioms for equality. The key is that paramodulation is a term-ori- 
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ented inference rule rather than a literal-oriented rule. This rule is definitely 
computer-oriented rather than person-oriented. Although the need for strategies 
to control the application of this inference rule is great, its use often yields 
impressive results, as we comment on in Section 2.6 when we discuss the commuta- 
tor theorem of group theory-a proof of which was obtained in less than 3 CPU 
seconds by using paramodulation. 
Rather than giving a formal definition of paramodulation, we shall, as in the 
preceding section, rely on examples. The first example illustrates the use of the 
simplest and most familiar form of equality substitution. The second illustrates a 
slightly more complex form of substitution-a form that will immediately seem 
reasonable-in that variables occur in one of the hypotheses, in the into clause. 
The third example, substantially more complex, is by far the most interesting, for it 
shows how paramodulation generalizes the standard notion of equality substitu- 
tion. 
For the first example, paramodulation applied to both the equation a + ( -a> = 0 
and the statement that a + (-a) is congruent to b yields in a single step the 
conclusion or statement hat 0 is congruent to b. In clause form, from 
EQUAL( SUlIl( a ,minus( u)) , 0) 
into 
CONGRUENT( SUI’Xl( U ,IIliIlUS( U)) ,b) 
one obtains the clause 
CONGRUENT(O,b) 
by paramodulation. 
For the second example, paramodulation applied to both the equation a + 
( -a) = 0 and the statement hat x + ( -a) is congruent to x yields in a single step 
the conclusion or statement hat 0 is congruent to a. In clause form, from 
EQUAL( sum( CI ,minus( a)) ,0) 
into 
CONGRUENT( SUm( r,minUS( U)) ,X) 
the clause 
CONGRUENT(O,U) 
is obtained. This example illustrates some of the complexity of paramodulation; in 
particular, the second occurrence of the variable x in the into clause becomes the 
constant a in the conclusion, but the term containing the first occurrence of x 
becomes the constant 0 in the conclusion. Although the unification of the first 
argument of the from clause with the first argument of the into clause temporarily 
requires both occurrences of the variable x to be replaced by the constant a, 
paramodulation then requires an additional term replacement justified by equality 
substitution, the replacement of a + (-a) by 0. 
Finally, for the third and complex example, paramodulation applied to both the 
equation x + (-X) = 0 and the equation y + (-y + z) = z yields in a single step 
the conclusion y + 0 = -(-y). In clause form, from 
EQUAL( SUm( x,minus( x)) ,o) 
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info 
Eou.4L(sum( y ,sum( minus( y ) J)) ,z) 
the clause 
EQUAL( SUm( y ,o) ,minus( minus( y ))) 
is obtained by paramodulation. 
To see that this last clause is in fact a logical consequence of its two parents, 
one unifies the argument sum(x,minus(x)) with the term sum(minus(y),z), applies 
the corresponding substitution to both the from and info clauses, and then makes 
the appropriate term replacement justified by the typical use of equality. The 
substitution found by the attempt to unify the given argument and given term 
requires substituting minus(y) for x and minus(minus(y)) for z. To prepare for the 
(standard) use of equality in this third example-and here we encounter a key 
feature of paramodulation-a nontrivial substitution for variables in both the from 
and the into clauses is required, which illustrates how paramodulation generalizes 
the usual notation of equality substitution. In contrast, in the standard use of 
equality substitution, one does not apply a nontrivial replacement for variables in 
both the from and the into statements. 
Summarizing, a successful use of paramodulation combines in a single step the 
process of finding the (in an obvious sense) most general common domain for 
which the from and into clauses are both relevant and applying standard equality 
substitution to that common domain. The complexity of this inference rule rests in 
part with (1) its unnaturalness (if viewed from the type of reasoning people 
employ), (2) the fact that the rule is permitted to apply nontrivial variable 
replacement o both of the statements under consideration, and (3) the fact that 
different occurrences of the same expression can be transformed differently. As an 
illustration of the third factor contributing to the complexity of paramodulation, in 
the last example we gave of its use, the (term containing the) first occurrence of z 
is transformed to 0, but the second occurrence of z is transformed to 
minus(minus( y N. The third example illustrates what we mean when we say that 
paramodulation is a term-oriented inference rule that generalizes equality substi- 
tution. 
A single application of paramodulation can lead to the deduction of an 
interesting conclusion that the usual mathematical reasoning requires more than 
one step to yield. In contrast to paramodulation, the mathematician or logician 
picks the instances-the substitutions of terms for variables-that might be of 
interest, and then applies (the usual notion of) equality substitution. Paramodula- 
tion, on the other hand, picks the (maximal) instances of the from and into clauses 
automaticahy and-rather than deducing intermediate conclusions by applying the 
corresponding replacement of terms for variables-combines the instance picking 
with a standard application of equality substitution. 
As with logic programming, avoiding the retention of intermediate conclusions 
can contribute markedly to the performance of a theorem-proving program. The 
instances that a person chooses may be far less general than those chosen by the 
theorem-proving program in its attempt to apply paramodulation. As a result, the 
program may deduce a conclusion that is far more general than a person might 
deduce. Again the program benefits, for its efficiency often increases by having 
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access to general conclusions rather than specific ones; people do not require such 
generality in most cases. 
Summarizing, the inference rule instantiation -replacing variables by terms in a 
statement o deduce a corollary-is frequently used, and used wisely, in mathemat- 
ics and logic. For example, a mathematician might use instantiation to deduce that 
(yzXyz> = e (the identity in a group) from the hypothesis that (xx) = e, and then 
use the new conclusion as a key step in proving that the type of group under study 
is commutative. A typical theorem-proving program would not draw such a 
conclusion, since instantiation is ordinarily not an inference rule offered by such a 
program, for no known strategy exists for wisely choosing appropriate instances 
even though mathematicians and logicians do have that ability. 
To give a second illustration of the power offered by paramodulation-if 
combined with a procedure (demodulation, see Section 2.4) used by theorem- 
proving programs to simplify expressions-we consider the following example, so 
typical of mathematics. In the example, the conclusion that is reached with a string 
of equalities (if one applies the usual type of reasoning that occurs in mathematics) 
is drawn by a theorem-proving program in a single deduction step: 
z=O+z=(x+(-x))+z=x+((--x)+z). 
This string of equalities constitutes a proof of an obvious but useful lemma in 
arithmetic and in group theory, the lemma that asserts the equality of the first and 
last expressions in the string of equalities. In clause notation, from right inverse 
mmL( sum( x ,minus( x)) ,O) 
into associativity 
EQUAL(SUIIl(SUlIl( U,U),Z) ,SUIIl( U,SUIll( U,Z))) 
the program can deduce 
nauAL(sum(O,z),sum( x,sum(minus( x),z))), 
which it can then automatically simplify (see Section 2.4) to 
EQUAL( z ,sum( x ,sum( minus( x) ,z)) ) 
without producing any intermediate results. 
To gain some insight into the power of paramodulation and to experience its 
usefulness, one can compare the two proofs of the commutator theorem that we 
give in Section 2.6. Even further, one might attempt to obtain a proof of this 
theorem with whatever program is available. If that program is based strictly on 
logic programming, then (especially since the sets of clauses for each proof consist 
of Horn clauses) such an attempt may yield important information. 
2.2.3. Linked Inference Rules. At this point, in contrast to focusing on a single 
inference rule, we turn to a class of inference rule--linked inference rules [42]. As 
we discuss linked inference rules, those who are familiar with logic programming 
may experience pleasure at recognizing certain properties shared by these infer- 
ence rules and the type of reasoning employed in logic programming. It may also 
be interesting to note that part of the motivation for the formulation of these rules 
is clearly reminiscent of one of the forces that caused logic programming to come 
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into existence-the desire to curtail information retention. Let us begin with a 
touch of history. 
From approximately twenty years of experimentation, we concluded-not with a 
rigorous proof-that one important source of ineffectiveness for automated theo- 
rem-proving programs is the retention of far too much information, especially the 
intermediate information that is used mainly to bridge the gaps between more 
interesting bits of information. The notion was that bridging clauses are in an 
important sense less significant and should therefore be prevented from playing an 
equal and active role in the program’s reasoning; in fact, such clauses should be 
present implicitly only. 
To achieve this end, we chose to switch the focus of attention from the bridging 
(less significant) clauses to certain of their parents. For example (taken from the 
“jobs puzzle” discussed later in this section), rather than considering the bridging 
clause 
7 MALE( Roberta) 
as the focus of attention, we switched the focus to the parent clause 
7 FEMALE(X) 1 7 MALE(X) 
from which the literal in the bridging clause is descended. By switching the focus of 
attention, we could force bridging clauses-which are not necessarily unit clauses 
-to be present implicitly only. We began to think of parent clauses of the type just 
given as links or Iinking clauses (not to be confused with the term links as used in 
connection graphs). The objective was to restrict the role of linking clauses, 
requiring them to play a subordinate role in any deduction step in which they are 
present by using them only to connect other pairs of clauses. To impose the 
desired restriction, we formulated the class of inference rule, linked inference rules, 
on which we focus in this section. Although somewhat hidden, part of the objective 
in formulating these new rules was the desire to generalize familiar inference rules 
and, even more important, the desire to permit a theorem-proving program to 
retain only significant bits of information in contrast to avoiding information 
retention entirely. 
Simply stated, the need to retain some new information rests with the desire to 
use an automated theorem-proving program to attack deep questions and hard 
problems, many of which are taken from mathematics. In mathematics, one often 
needs to repeatedly apply various lemmas to prove the theorem under study, and 
some of those lemmas require many CPU minutes to prove. In such a case, one 
cannot afford to repeatedly prove the needed lemmas. Even more important, if 
one retains no new information, then there exists the potential for pursuing a huge 
number of paths in search of a proof. To sharply reduce that number-and 
perhaps to sharply reduce the amount of backtracking-a program can employ 
demodulation (Section 2.4) and subsumption (Section 2.5). 
To see how demodulation is useful, how its use sharply reduces a search for 
information, and how its use increases the effectiveness of a search for a proof, let 
us imagine that we are studying group theory. Among the demodulators (rules for 
rewriting information into a canonical form) that we recommend for inclusion in 
the input for such a study is the axiom for left identity 
EQUAL( prOd( e,x) ,x) 
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with e denoting the identity of a group. If clauses are retained and demodulation is 
used, then the program will never consider a path involving the clause 
ELEMENT(prOd( .?,a) ,h) 
(the product of e and a is an element of the set H) once it has considered the 
clause 
ELEMENT( a ,h) , 
because the first of the two clauses in the predicate ELEMENT will be demodulated 
to the second, and then discarded by using subsumption; the two clauses corre- 
spond to versions of essentially the same fact. Even more annoying than pursuit of 
the type of path just illustrated is the case in which the program discovers that 
a = b, but then either fails to demodulate one to the other because no equivalent 
of demodulation is in use, or cannot demodulate one to the other, as occurs when 
clauses are not retained. In contrast to what we conjecture is crucial for attacking 
problems from mathematics and logic-namely, the retention of clauses-without 
demodulation, various versions of essentially the same fact will be available to 
cause the program to pursue corresponding paths. 
With regard to subsumption by itself, if the program deduces 
EQUAL( U ,a) 
as a fascinating conclusion, the use of subsumption will immediately cause the 
discarding of that clause in the presence of 
EQUAL( X,X) 
and thus avoid various paths of inquiry. This last clause-reflexivity of equality-is 
always present when equality is relevant, even when paramodulation is used. 
Without retaining clauses and using demodulation and subsumption, we thus see 
how a program can pursue numerous paths that would otherwise be avoided. 
In contrast to the situation in which one wishes a program to assist in answering 
some deep question or some hard problem that requires a general search for 
information, we know of two cases in which the choice to avoid information 
retention seems very wise. The first case focuses on reasoning that is algorithmic in 
character. When one knows the precise paths to pursue to reach the desired 
answer or to obtain the desired proof, then, indeed, why retain any intermediate 
information--why not consider all clauses that are in the input but are not nuclei 
or satelhtes as links to the desired result? (The terms nucleus and satellite are 
informally defined in Section 2.2.1, and examples relevant to linked UR-resolution 
and to linked hyperresolution are given in the discussion of the “jobs puzzle” 
found later in this section.) We in fact applaud logic programming for taking this 
approach when presented with problems for which one can find an appropriate 
algorithm to apply. 
The second case concerns the proof of extremely simple theorems. For such 
theorems, one can profitably apply a simple strategy (see Section 2.3) and can 
afford to pursue a few distinct paths before completing a proof; backtracking can 
be kept to a minimum. After all, if the theorem under study is easy to prove, then 
the program’s chance of succeeding may indeed be high and may require the 
traversal of only short paths, and not very many of those either. 
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Unfortunately, one seldom knows before the fact whether a theorem is easy to 
prove. Therefore-and let us be explicit in this regard-we strongly favor the 
approach that retains a number of clauses when the assignment concerns the proof 
of some theorem; we conjecture that automated theorem-proving programs that 
avoid essentially all retention of new information will prove to offer insufficient 
power. We shall say more about this issue in Section 5. However, since the needed 
experimental data for validating or refuting our conjecture are still lacking, we are 
pleased to note that researchers are studying the approach to theorem proving that 
is based on the spirit of logic programming. 
Given our view concerning the need to retain information-and noting that, 
although we have found standard inference rules like those discussed in Section 
2.2.1 to be useful, their use often causes a program to retain too many clauses-the 
question is what to do next. One obvious answer is to generalize, and one clue as 
to how to make appropriate generalizations rests with the desire to give an 
automated theorem-proving program the capacity to “jump to conclusions”, pro- 
vided that the conclusions follow logically. For example, if in some puzzle one 
knows that the job of nurse is held by a male and that Roberta has the job of 
teacher or nurse, one jumps correctly to the conclusion that Roberta is not a nurse. 
Of course-in addition to the missing fact that Roberta must be female-the key 
missing fact asserts that people who are female are not male. In particular, the 
clause 
7 FEMALE(X) 1 7 MALE(X) 
links the clause 
FEMALE( Roberta) 
to the clause 
7 HASA.IOB( x,nurse) I MALE(X) 
to draw the correct conclusion that Roberta is not the nurse. 
We say “jumps to the conclusion” because a person ordinarily does not 
explicitly conclude-or even notice that an intermediate conclusion has been 
drawn-that Roberta is not male. We surmised (with no stroke of brilliance) that 
if an automated theorem-proving program could reason similarly, then the pro- 
gram would be more effective in its reasoning. Therefore, we formulated linked 
inference rules accordingly: rules that would treat certain bits of trivial information 
as present implicitly only, rather than having such information explicitly present in 
the database of facts and relations. 
For our first illustration-to remove any distractions resulting from a lack of 
familiarity with the problem domain-we focus on a fragment from the “jobs 
puzzle” (see Chapter 3 of [38]), delaying the presentation of a far more interesting 
example of deductive reasoning until Section 2.6. The jobs puzzle concerns four 
people (Roberta, Thelma, Steve, and Pete) and eight jobs (actor, boxer, chef, 
guard, nurse, police officer, teacher, and telephone operator). Each person holds 
two jobs. You are asked to determine which jobs are held by which people. Among 
the clues, you are told that Roberta is not the chef, and that the husband of the 
chef is the telephone operator. 
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One immediately and correctly deduces-jumps to the conclusion-that Thelma 
must be the chef. A brief examination of the following five clauses show that 
UR-resolution can be used to reach the same conclusion, but three steps are 
required rather than the one that appears to be sufficient. On the other hand, as 
we shall show, by applying linked UR-resolution, one step is in fact enough. In 
addition, where standard UR-resolution (with the given clauses) requires the 
program to key on a general fact (J-5) rather than on the specific fact (J-1) that 
should initiate the deduction, linked UR-resolution behaves as one prefers by 
using the better choice to initiate the deduction as one would hope-by keying on 
clause (J-1). 
Let us consider the following five clauses, and then focus on standard UR-reso- 
lution versus linked UR-resolution: 
Roberta is not the chef. 
(J-1) 7 HAsA.roB(Roberta,chef) 
If a job is held by a female, then the female is Roberta or Thelma. 
(J-2) 7 FEMALE(iobholder( y )) I HAsA.roB(Roberta, y ) 1 HAsAJoB(Thelma, y> 
If a person is a wife, then that person is female. 
(J-3) THUSBAND 1 FEMALE(y) 
The person who holds the job of telephone operator is the husband of the 
person who holds the job of chef. 
(J-4) 7 HASAJOB(X,telOp) 1 HuSBANdX, jObhOlder(Chef)) 
For every job, there is a person holding that job. 
(J-5) HAsA.JoB(jobholder( y >, y) 
UR-resolution suffices to yield the desired conclusion (J-8) in three steps. From 
clause (J-5) as satellite and clause (J-4) as nucleus, 
(J-6) HusBAND(jobholder( telop), jobholder( chef)) 
is obtained. From clause (J-6) as satellite and clause (J-3) as nucleus, 
(J-7) FEMALE(jObhOlder( Chef)) 
is obtained. And finally, from clauses (J-7) and (J-l) as satellites with clause (J-2) 
as nucleus, 
(J-8) HAsA.ioB( Thelmachef) 
is deduced as the desired result. 
A person solving this puzzle fragment would simply and naturally conclude 
clause (J-8) by (simultaneously) considering the information contained in clauses 
(J-l) through (J-5). The information contained in clauses (J-6) and (J-7) would not 
exist, at least explicitly. One variant of linked UR-resolution would also immedi- 
ately deduce clause (J-8), but-in contrast to standard UR-resolution-by simulta- 
neously considering clauses (J-l) through (J-5) and without deducing clauses (J-6) 
and (J-7). In particular, in the terminology sometimes used in discussing linked 
inference [42], the user could instruct a reasoning program to choose clause (J-1) 
as the initiating satellite and the predicate HASAJOB as the target. With those 
choices, clause (J-2) is the nucleus, and clauses (J-3) and (J-4) are finking clauses 
that link clause (J-2) to the satellite, clause (J-5). Clauses (J-6) and (J-7) are 
present implicitly only. 
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For a simple example of linked hyperresoiution-and, because the clause on 
which we focus consists solely of negative literals, one that reflects some of the 
spirit of logic programming-we can again borrow from the jobs puzzle, but with a 
slight twist. We consider clauses (J-9) through (J-12): 
The job of nurse is held by a male 
(J-9) -rHAskloB(X,nUrSe) 1 MALE(X) 
Everyone is not female or not male 
(J-10) 7FEMALE(X)I 7MALE(X) 
Roberta is female 
(J-1 1) FEMALE(ROberta) 
Roberta has the job of nurse 
(J-12) HASA.IOB(ROberta,nUrSee) 
letting clause (J-10) be the nucleus-the clause whose negative literals are to be 
removed-or, using the terminology of logic programming, the goal clause. The 
object (which is the slight twist) is to prove that Roberta is not the nurse, which 
explains the presence of clause (J-12). With linked hyperresolution, clause (J-101 
could be used to initiate the search, and thus play the role of an initiating nucleus. 
Alternatively, clause (J-11) could be used as an initiating satellite to unify with one 
of the literals of clause (J-101, and clause (J-9) could be used both to unify with the 
other literal of clause (J-10) and to link clause (J-10) to clause (J-12). 
This example illustrates how linked hyperresolution generalizes ordinary hyper- 
resolution, for one of the negative literals of clause (J-101, instead of being 
removed with a positive clause, is removed with a clause containing a negative 
literal, which in turn is removed with a positive clause. We note the parallel to the 
preceding example (used to illustrate linked UR), which showed how the require- 
ment to remove iiterals with the use of unit clauses was relaxed. For a second 
parallel, just as the example of linked UR-resolution treats certain information as 
present implicitly only, the example of linked hyperresolution treats the fact that 
Roberta is not male as being present implicitly only. 
Linked inference rules, as can be seen from the two examples, offer various 
advantages over the corresponding standard versions and over logic programming. 
First, information that would ordinarily be retained explicitly is instead retained 
implicitly, an important property ‘well recognized in logic programming. Second, 
from the viewpoint of strategy (Section 2.31, the use of linked inference rules 
permits one to make better choices for the clause or clauses on which to base the 
entire attack on a given problem. In particular -in the spirit of the set of support 
strategy (Section 2.3)-clause (J-1) is a far more effective choice than clause (J-51, 
and clause (J-12) is a far more effective choice than clause (J-10). 
In contrast, the use of standard UR resolution in the first example would 
encourage one to key the attack on clause (J-51, and the use of logic programming 
would force one to key the attack on clause (J-10). Clauses (J-5) and (J-10) are not 
particularly satisfying choices because of their generality. As we discuss in the 
section on strategy, the use of information that is specific to the problem is a far 
better choice. Finally, rather than-as in logic programming-complete avoidance 
of new information, the use of linked inference rules allows the user to specify the 
types of intermediate information to retain. For example, the user can specify a 
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predicate, such as HASAJOB, that is of interest, and have the program retain all 
clauses in which the only predicate that occurs is that which is chosen by the user. 
At this point, if one revisits the example of linked hyperresolution, one can see 
how it does indeed generalize the type of reasoning employed in logic program- 
ming. In both, one is allowed to use clauses containing both positive and negative 
literals to remove a negative literal from the initiating nucleus or goal clause. 
These mixed clauses link the goal clause to satellites-as they are called for 
hyperresolution-or positive clauses. In other words, just as linked hyperresolution 
gives the program the added latitude of using mixed clauses as links (which 
parallels the added latitude in linked UR-resolution of allowing the use of nonunit 
clauses as links), logic programming uses such mixed clauses. 
Of course, since the retention of information is crucial to many applications of 
automated theorem proving (in contrast to the single goal clause used in logic 
programming), the use of linked hyperresolution will typically involve a number of 
initiating nuclei or a number of nuclei each called into play because of the use of a 
number of initiating satellites. Also, as already mentioned, logic programming does 
not adhere to the spirit of hyperresolution (focusing on clauses as nuclei that 
contain positive literals), while linked hyperresolution typically does, even allowing 
the use of nuclei that are not Horn clauses. Nevertheless, one more connection 
between logic programming and automated theorem proving exists, and-if one of 
the many researchers in logic programming studies linked inference rules and 
gains some as yet unseen insight-perhaps an extension to logic programming will 
result that exhibits an even closer connection between the two fields. 
2.3. Strategy 
Despite our obvious enthusiasm about various inference rules and their potential 
value to logic programming (for example, the use of paramodulation), we cannot 
overemphasize the need for strategy to control their application. Indeed, by 
applying the obvious metarule about getting nothing free, one can easily predict 
that, when a powerful procedure (such as paramodulation) is used, hazards will be 
encountered. The key is to use strategy-strategy to restrict reasoning, and 
strategy to direct reasoning. 
The need for strategy is clearly recognized in logic programming, as evidenced 
by the use of a depth-first search strategy and a left-to-right ordering strategy for 
solving subgoals. However, we suspect that very few people in logic programming 
know that the field relies on a very restricted use of a well-known strategy in 
automated theorem proving, the set of support strategy, that was introduced in 1965 
[40]. In this section, we focus heavily on that strategy, and discuss it in its most 
general form. We shall also discuss a strategy-the weighting strategy [17]-that 
permits the user to impose knowledge and intuition on an automated theorem-pro- 
ving program’s attack on a problem. Perhaps researchers in logic programming can 
find a way to use the set of support strategy more fully than it is used now, and can 
also find a way to use the weighting strategy. Certainly-from our viewpoint-the 
current use of strategy in logic programming appears to be insufficient, if the goal 
is to use logic programming to answer deep questions or solve hard problems from 
mathematics. Indeed, perhaps the most significant issue raised in this article is that 
focusing on the use and importance of strategy. 
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In fact, even with the power offered by an inference rule such as paramodula- 
tion-which enables a theorem-proving program to treat equality as “understood” 
-the use of strategy is essential. Simply stated- from the viewpoint of automated 
theorem proving-without strategy, the program can deduce far too many conclu- 
sions and too easily proceed in an unprofitable direction. From the viewpoint of 
logic programming (especially if the question under study is deep), without a 
sophisticated use of strategy, a program written in, say, PROLOG can too easily 
pursue a huge number of paths before finding an answer, if indeed it ever does. 
For a taste of the power of paramodulation that shows why the use of strategy 
of various kinds is absolutely necessary- even though an examination of our 
example may, for some, (mistakenly) weaken our case for treating equality as a 
“built-in” concept-let us briefly focus on the equation that gives the actions of 
the combinator W in combinatory logic: 
(K)Y = (W)Y. 
If one applies reasoning in the spirit of equality substitution-more accurately, if 
one applies paramodulation-to W with itself, one deduces the following sixteen 
clauses: 
(W((WX)Y)>Z = NXY)Y>Z)Z, 
(WXX(WY)Z) = M(Yz)z)x(yz)z), 
ovwx = (xX)x, 
(wGy)Y>>z = KWX>Y)Z)Z, 
(WXX(YZ)Z) = MWY)Z)X(YZ)Z), 
MXYNY = (WX)Y)Y, 
(WXX(YZ)Z) = M(Yz)z)x(wY)z), 
(WX>Y = (WXIY, 
(WGY)y))z = ((wx>y)z)z, 
(WxX(yz)z) = (XKWY)Z)X(WY)Z), 
bY>Y = hY)Y, 
(W((Wx)yNz = Kty)y)z>z, 
(WxX(Wy)z> = (XKYZ)Z>X(WY)Z), 
(W(Wx>)y = KxY>Y)Y, 
(WXX(WY)Z) = (X((WY)Z)X(YZ)Z), 
(W>x = (xX)x. 
Of the sixteen given clauses, the first eight are obtained by paramodulating from 
the right side of the equation for W into various terms, and the last eight are 
obtained by paramodulating from the left side. One can imagine how many 
additional conclusions would be drawn were we to continue reasoning by focusing 
on pairs of those sixteen conclusions -the members of the first generation of 
descendants of W with itself-and then reason by focusing on the second 
generation. 
To avoid the flood of conclusions that can result if reasoning is uncontrolled, an 
automated theorem-proving program can use various types of strategy. Some types 
of strategy are designed to restrict the reasoning; some are designed to direct it. 
From a different perspective, some types of strategy are general in the sense that 
they apply to all inference rules, and others are specific in the sense that they apply 
only to a single inference rule. 
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Of those of a general nature, the most powerful restriction strategy that an 
automated theorem-proving program can use is called the set of support strategy 
[401. That strategy restricts the program’s reasoning with the intention of sharply 
retarding the generation of irrelevant conclusions. To use the set of support 
strategy, one is required to choose a subset T of the set S of input clauses given to 
the program to describe the problem to be studied. The program then draws a 
conclusion only if it is recursively traceable to T. Therefore, at the beginning of the 
program’s attack on a problem-from a procedural viewpoint-an inference rule 
is applied to a subset of clauses from S only if at least one of its members is in T. 
Any clause that is retained is automatically given the power of the clauses that are 
members of T. Thus, after additional clauses have been retained, an inference rule 
can be applied to a subset of clauses if one of them is a clause not in S-a clause 
that is not an input clause. Stated another way, with the set of support strategy, the 
program is not allowed to apply an inference rule to a subset of clauses all of 
which are in S - T. 
To see that logic programming does indeed rely on the use of a restricted form 
of the set of support strategy, let us consider the recommended ways to use this 
strategy. We recommend either of two uses. For each, let any given set of clauses 
that is used to present a question or problem to a theorem-proving program be 
divided into three sets: (1) those that correspond to the axioms of the underlying 
theory and any lemmas that are to be used, (2) those (the special hypotheses) that 
correspond to the extra assumptions (if any), and (3) those (the denial of the 
conclusion) that correspond to assuming that the theorem is false. For example, let 
us consider the theorem that asserts that, in a group, if the square of every element 
is the identity, then the group is commutative. By applying our rule for partitioning 
the set of clauses used to present a problem, set (1) would consist of those clauses 
that correspond to the axioms of a group and any lemmas to be used, set (2) would 
consist of those clauses that correspond to the assertion that the square of every 
element is the identity, and set (3) would consist of those clauses that correspond 
to assuming that the group is not commutative. 
Our first recommendation for the use of the set of support is to choose for the 
set T (see the informal definition given earlier) the union of the special hypothesis 
and the denial of the conclusion. Our second-and less preferred-recommenda- 
tion is to choose for the set of support T only those clauses that correspond to the 
denial of the conclusion of the theorem under study. One should note that, since 
the clauses that are present because of assuming the theorem false may in fact 
include clauses free of 7 hot), even by following our second recommendation one 
does not necessarily imitate precisely what occurs in logic programming. The 
reason is obvious-in logic programming, the goal clause must be negative. For 
example, the goal clause for the illustration of linked hyperresolution (Section 
2.2.3) would be 
(J-10) TFEMALE( X) 1 TMALE( X) 
if logic programming were given this puzzle fragment to solve. As commented, 
such a choice is unfortunate in that it permits a program to delve deeply into 
background information rather than focusing on the specific program to solve-in 
particular, such a choice does not reflect the spirit of the set of support strategy. 
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We can now summarize to see how logic programming does indeed rely on the 
use of the set of support strategy. One simply adds a single clause-the goal clause 
-all of whose literals are in effect negative literals, and requires that all of the 
program’s reasoning be recursively traceable to that single clause. Phrased in terms 
of automated theorem proving, one chooses for the set of support a single clause 
containing no positive literals. Ordinarily, the clause selected for the set of support 
would be one of the clauses that are present because of assuming the theorem 
under consideration false. However, for those cases in which each of those clauses 
contains at least one positive literal, the actions one is forced to take in logic 
programming are not in the spirit of automated theorem proving. In particular, in 
logic programming one must try various clauses from the problem description, 
requiring, of course, that each be in effect a negative clause. By taking such an 
action, one is still relying on the use of the set of support strategy, for the program 
is not allowed to apply its reasoning to a set of clauses none of which is traceable 
to the selected clause. Unfortunately, from the viewpoint of automated theorem 
proving and the intent of the set of support strategy, this action risks the danger of 
using an axiom as the set of support. We shall return to this issue later in this 
article. 
At present, if one is contemplating the study of deep questions or hard 
problems by using an approach that closely imitates that taken in logic program- 
ming, the following analysis might merit serious thought. In the best case-if 
viewed from the perspective of the set of support strategy-the reasoning 
employed by logic programming mirrors that applied by an automated theorem- 
proving program when the assumption that the theorem is false leads to the 
addition of exactly one clause, and that clause consists of all negative literals. In 
the worst case-using a set of support that consists of a single clause and one that 
corresponds to an axiom of the theory from which the problem is taken-the 
reasoning employed by logic programming diverges sharply from that employed by 
a theorem-proving program. For deep questions or hard problems, such a choice 
for the set of support is at best unwise. Indeed, when the difficulty is high, the 
probability is also high that the program, to succeed, will be forced to pursue a 
number of paths more or less independently. 
The need to pursue independent paths is tightly coupled with access to the 
presence in the initial set of support of at least a few clauses-certainly more than 
one. More important, such serious studies must not be burdened with reasoning 
that stems from the axioms of a theory. Rather, the needed reasoning must be 
severely restricted to the information outside of that which corresponds to axioms 
and lemmas. This last observation explains why our recommended use of the set of 
support strategy asks the user to place in the set of support, in addition to the 
clauses that are present because of assuming the theorem false, those that 
correspond to the special hypothesis. 
If one were to follow our recommendation, and if one were to attempt to use a 
program to prove the commutator theorem relying on the P-formulation (Section 
2.6), then one would place in the set of support clauses (COM-1) through 
(COM-8). In contrast, if one were to attack this theorem in the spirit of logic 
programming, then the set of support would consist of clause (COM-8) only. With 
this choice-rather than even following our second recommendation concerning 
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the set of support strategy-one would be using only part of the denial of the 
conclusion. Indeed, the denial consists of clauses (COM-3) through (COM-8). 
Although any attempt to prove the commutator theorem should prove exciting 
(playing against long odds), one might attempt to obtain a computer proof by 
forcing the set of support to consist of clause (COM-8) only. We conjecture that 
disaster will occur. 
If, instead of relying on the P-formulation, one were to attempt to prove the 
commutator theorem using the notation that emphasizes equality, then one would 
use clauses (COMEQ-1) through (COMEQ-3), if the intent was to follow our 
preference. On the other hand, were one using a theorem-proving program based 
on logic programming technology, then one would use clause (COMEQ-3) only. 
One might find it challenging to make such an attempt. Again we conjecture that 
disaster will occur. Our conjecture becomes even more piquant when one notes 
that we did in fact succeed in proving the commutator theorem with one of our 
programs-the program TPO, which executes rather slowly compared to our other 
programs-and with only clause (COMEQ-3) in the set of support; however, the 
program relied on the use of the inference rule negative hyperparamodulation [36]. 
The proof was obtained in 193 CPU seconds on a Sun 3/75, generating 405 clauses 
and retaining 115. In contrast-and we recognize that comparative analyses are 
complicated and that the ideal data are unavailable-by using paramodulation and 
following our recommendation for the use of the set of support strategy, a proof 
was obtained with an earlier program in 3 CPU seconds on a computer that is five 
to ten times more powerful. 
Although we heartily endorse a variety of approaches to serious studies and 
often learn from different paradigms for automated theorem proving, we regret- 
fully conjecture that-without substantial data to the contrary-an approach to 
studies focusing on deep questions from mathematics, if based primarily on logic 
programming technology, must fail. Of course, for simple theorems such a technol- 
ogy may indeed prove fruitful. 
Because one should attempt to at least provide an example when using a 
nebulous concept such as simple theorem, let us immediately do so. We include 
among simple theorems that which asks one to prove commutativity for groups for 
which one knows that the square of every element is the identity. This theorem was 
proved in 1965 with binary resolution and the set of support strategy and without 
demodulation (see Section 2.4) on a Control Data Corporation 3600 in less than 3 
CPU seconds. The theorem is referred to as a classroom exercise by algebraists, 
but it does serve well for illustrating concepts and approaches. In contrast, we 
include among somewhat difficult theorems to prove the commutator theorem, 
which in Section 2.6 we present, discuss, and prove in two different ways. 
We consider it important to exercise great care when estimating the power of an 
automated theorem-proving program, especially when the estimate is based on 
proving simple theorems. On the other hand, if one has designed a program that 
proves simple theorems in very little CPU time (say, less than 5 CPU seconds per 
proof) and with a high degree of success, then one is indeed justified in claiming an 
important achievement. 
To complement the objective of the set of support strategy-for a general 
strategy that can be used to direct, rather than restrict, the program’s 
reasoning-one can use the weighting strategy. To use this strategy, one assigns 
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priorities, called weights, to the various concepts, relations, and terms. The weights 
can be based simply on symbol count, or they can be based on a set of elaborate 
templates. The theorem-proving program uses the weights to choose from among 
the various clauses that on which to focus its attention. In other words, by using 
the weights to select which path of reasoning to follow, the program directs its 
reasoning. 
For example, for the commutator theorem, one could instruct the program to 
prefer expressions containing one occurrence of the function inv to all other 
expressions; one simply assigns a low weight to inv and higher weights to all other 
functions and constants. Similarly, in the “jobs puzzle” and its variants, one can 
assign a low weight to Roberta, a slightly higher weight to Thelma, and the like, if 
one wishes the program to focus on information about Roberta in preference to 
focusing on information about Thelma. For a more detailed discussion of using 
weighting and the set of support strategy, one can browse in [381 or in [351. 
In addition to using the set of support strategy, which is a general strategy 
designed to restrict the application of any inference rule, an automated theorem- 
proving program can also use a number of other strategies that are specific in that 
they are designed to restrict the application of paramodulation. First, the program 
can be restricted from paramodulating from or into a variable. This restriction 
prevents a myriad of conclusions from being drawn. It is, in most cases, mandatory. 
After all, paramodulating from or into a variable will always yield a conclusion, 
since the corresponding unification can never fail. Second, the program can be 
required to paramodulate only from a specified side of each equality. In some 
cases, all applications of paramodulation are required to be from the left side only; 
in others, from the right only. 
Because of our desire to further pique the interest of researchers in logic 
programming, and because we explicitly recognize that far more control over 
reasoning is required for automated theorem proving to reach its potential, we 
close this section on strategy with a few incomplete notions about additional 
possibilities. One strategy that might merit exploration concerns choosing the path 
for an attempt at solving a subgoal according to the number of literals in the clause 
to be used, with a preference for unit clauses. A second strategy focuses on 
choosing the subgoal to attempt to solve according to the likelihood of failure. 
Either of the two strategies could take into account or ignore the current partial 
instantiation. A third strategy-which might be considered as a generalization of 
“assert” in PROLOG-would permit a user to give criteria for the program to 
apply to decide which items of information to retain. For a fourth strategy-one 
that might prove useful for enabling logic programming to rely more on a natural 
representation, as occurs to some degree in the theorem on index 2 (Section 
2.1)-one could consider the use of automated tautology adjunction followed by 
case splitting. For example, if we borrow from an approach commonly taken in 
mathematics, the two natural cases to consider for the index-2 theorem focus, 
respectively, on the case in which a is an element of the subgroup 0 and on the 
case in which a is not an element of the subgroup. As one no doubt guesses, 
currently it is not clear to us how to complete this approach to cope with non-Horn 
clauses. Nevertheless, because the use of strategy is vital to attacking deep 
questions and hard problems, consideration of the preceding incomplete notions as 
well as the others presented in this section might prove challenging. 
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2.4. Dernodula tion 
The next topic for this review of automated theorem proving is that of canonical- 
ization, which is available to automated theorem-proving programs through the use 
of demodulation [41] (see the two proofs in Section 2.6 below). In many areas of 
mathematics and logic, one often rewrites each new item of information into a 
canonical form. In automated theorem proving, a similar action can be taken. Of 
course, if as in logic programming no new clauses are retained, then one might 
conclude that canonicalization is of no interest. We suspect that such a position 
has hidden flaws in it, as we discussed in Section 2.2.3. Indeed, not only is 
demodulation essential for automated theorem proving; its use might also merit 
serious consideration for logic programming, which we briefly discussed in Section 
2.2.3. 
With regard to canonicalization, a sharp difference, however, exists between 
mathematics and automated theorem proving. In the former, one uses canonical- 
ization when it seems convenient and appropriate. In the latter, one cannot in 
most cases exercise such freedom, for without automatically requiring each conclu- 
sion to be rewritten into a canonical form, the program will drown in information. 
Of course, some conclusions will be unaffected by the particular choice of demodu- 
lators [41] in a given problem. 
One other difference exists between the use of canonicalization by a mathemati- 
cian or logician and its use by a theorem-proving program. When a person uses 
various equalities for canonicalization, the equalities are applied only to the 
expressions chosen by the person; when a program applies such equalities, all 
expressions to which the equalities are applicable are in fact rewritten into a 
canonical form. Now, let us examine some typical uses of canonicalization. 
One might, for example, uniformly replace -C-t) by t for any term t, or 
replace r(s + t) by rs + rt for terms r, s, and t. For such term replacements, many 
automated theorem-proving programs offer the mechanism demodulation, referred 
to earlier, which automatically rewrites expressions into a canonical form according 
to some set of rewrite rules called demodulators. The demodulators can be 
included among the input clauses, or the program can be asked to find potentially 
useful ones. For the two given examples, the demodulators 
EouAL( minus( minus( x)) ,x) 
and 
EQuAL(prod( x,sum( y,.z)),sum(prod(x,y),prod( x,2>)) 
can be used, respectively. 
As one might predict, care must be taken in the choice of which equality clauses 
to attempt to use as demodulators. In particular, an unwise choice can cause the 
program to loop. To see how looping can occur, let us consider what will happen 
when the equation for the combinator W is used as a demodulator and when the 
program encounters a term of a certain type. In particular, when the clause 
(w)EQUAL(a(a(W,x),Y),a(a(x,Y),Y)) 
is used as a demodulator and the term Www is encountered, this term will be 
transformed to itself repeatedly without ever terminating. For a more interesting 
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example, let us consider the expression 
r=a(a(w,a(B,x)),a(W,a(B,x))) 
and what occurs when the two demodulators (for the combinators W and B) 
(w) EQUAL(U(U(W,x),Y),U(U(x,Y),Y)) 
and 
(B)EQUAL(U(U(U(B,x),Y),z),U(x,U(Y,z))) 
are applied to r with the object of producing a canonical form. Demodulation 
begins by successfully applying W, then B, to obtain 
which leads to another successful application of W followed by one of B to obtain 
which of course leads to yet another success and, in fact, to a nonterminating 
sequence of successful applications of W and B. 
Nevertheless, as long as one is careful about the choice of demodulators, the 
use of demodulation can sharply increase the effectiveness of a theorem-proving 
program in its search for assignment completion. Further, for many studies, 
without the use of demodulation the program will simple require an inordinate 
amount of computer time to complete rather simple assignments. 
For those familiar with functional programming, demodulation is similar to 
reduction in which the reduction rules are the demodulators. In fact, demodulation 
(in the context of automated theorem proving) has been used as a general-purpose 
functional programming language [32]. 
2.5. Subsumption 
We now come to the next-to-the-last opic of this section, subsumption, a mecha- 
nism that-like demodulation-is almost always essential for a theorem-proving 
program to be effective. Such a mechanism might also merit study for logic 
programming, as we briefly touched on in Section 2.2.3. Although the use of 
various types of strategy does indeed contribute markedly to the efficiency of an 
automated theorem-proving program, such a program continues to deduce conclu- 
sions that are trivial and unneeded corollaries of existing clauses. For example, if 
the program paramodulates from the second argument of the clause equivalent of 
(WX)Y = (xy>Y 
into the first subargument of the second argument of the clause equivalent of 
(W(WJ$Y = ((xy>Y>Y, 
the program deduces the clause equivalent of 
(W(ti))Y = ((WVYIY, 
which is a trivial corollary, in fact an instance, of 
(wx>Y = (XYIY 
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and is therefore immediately discarded. The procedure for discarding such deduc- 
tions is subsumption [261. The clause A subsumes the clause B if there exists a 
uniform replacement of terms for variables in A that produces a clause that is a 
subclause of B. 
For a second example of subsumption, an example that might not be expected, 
let us consider the two clauses 
4x> IflY) 
and 
4x1 
and recall that a variable is relevant only to the clause in which it occurs. That the 
second clause subsumes the first follows immediately from the definition of 
subsumption. However, as it turns out, the first also subsumes the second, as can 
be seen by replacing y by x in the first to produce 
P(x), 
since a clause, by definition, does not allow duplicate literals; technically, a clause 
is defined as a set of distinct literals. As an aside, if we wished to have our program 
use instantiation as an inference rule to permit the program to imitate the 
corresponding type of reasoning (discussed in Section 2.2) that is often used in 
mathematics, we would be forced to protect the instances that were deduced so 
that subsumption would not immediately discard them. 
Of especial use is the role of subsumption for removing clauses that assert the 
equality of a term with itself; such an assertion is, needless to say, usually of little 
interest and seldom useful. To remove such trivial clauses, the clause 
EQUAL( X,X) 
for reflexivity of equality is used to subsume many clauses that would otherwise be 
kept. This clause, which must be included in the input if paramodulation is the 
chosen rule of inference, is also important in that a proof often terminates with the 
deduction of a clause of the form 
TEQUAL( t,t) 
for some term t. 
2.6. Examples of Proof by Contradiction 
In the interest of addressing all of the major elements of automated theorem 
proving, here we focus on proof by contradiction. We content ourselves with two 
proofs of a theorem, the commutator theorem, from group theory. This focus 
fulfills our promise, made in Section 1.3, of supplying proofs for the challenge 
problem posed there. For other interesting examples of such proofs, we recom- 
mend the two books cited earlier 138,351. A study of proofs of theorems that are 
not considered trivial can be most instructive and, more important, can lead to an 
appreciation of what has been achieved, why certain mechanisms are used, and 
what is needed but not yet available. 
Consideration of the commutator theorem illustrates (1) the need for using 
demodulation, (2) the need for using subsumption, (3) the need for retaining 
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clauses, and (4) the need for using powerful strategies. In short, the theorem we 
now consider-whose proof we give so that one can measure the performance of 
one’s program-provides an example of why we conjecture that shortcuts to 
producing a program that offers sufficient power must fail. 
Although we ordinarily prefer a notation that emphasizes the role of equality, 
for this theorem we shall rely instead on the so-called P-formulation. One might 
note that the clauses we give for this problem are in fact Horn clauses, which 
means that the theorem is-theoretically-in reach of logic programming. One 
need not be familiar with group theory to study this theorem, especially since we 
give its proof. However, one’s understanding is increased by noting that the 
commutator [x,y] of any two elements x and y of a group is the product of x, y, 
the inverse of x, and the inverse of y. The theorem to prove asserts that if the 
cube of every element x in the group is the identity e, then [[x,y],y] = e for all x 
and y. 
The following set of twenty-five clauses includes a subset that provides a 
complete characterization for abstract group theory-the first seventeen. Those 
twenty-five clauses can be used to present one notational version of the theorem to 
be proved. For those interested in the fine points of a theory, one can dispense 
with ten of the first seventeen clauses if one wishes to rely on a set containing no 
dependent clauses; indeed, the set consisting of clauses (GT-11, (GT-31, (GT-5), 
(GT-61, (GT-7), (GT-81, and (GT-14) also provides a complete characterization for 
abstract group theory. 
Left identity: 
(GT-1) P(e,x,x) 
Right identity: 
(GT-2) P(x,e,x) 
Left inverse: 
(GT-3) P(inv(x),x,e) 
Right inverse: 
(GT-4) P(x,inv(x),e) 
Associativity: 
(GT-5) 1 P(x,y,u) I 1 P(y,z,u) I 7 P(u,z,w) I P(x,u,w) 
(GT-6) 1 P(x,y,u) I -, P(y,z,u) I 7 P(x,u,w) IP(u,z,w) 
Closure (perhaps, more accurately, totality): 
(GT-7) P(x,Y, prod(x,yN 
Product is well defined: 
(GT-8) 1 p(x,y,u) I -, P(x,y,u) I EQUAL(U,U) 
Equality is reflexive: 
(GT-9) EQUAL( X,X) 
Equality is symmetric: 
(GT-10) -EQUAL(X,y) 1 EQUAL(y,X) 
Equality is transitive: 
(GT-11) lEQUAL(X,yY) 1 lEQUAL(y,Z) I EQUAL(X,Z) 
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Equality substitution: 
(GT-12) 7EQUAL(U,U) 1 7 pb,x,y) 1 P(u,x,y) 
(GT-13) ~EQUAL(U,U) 1 -I f’(x,u,y) 1 p(x,u,y) 
(GT-14) -EQUAL&&J) 1 1 P(x,y,u) 1 P(x,y,u) 
(GT-15) TEQUAL(U,U) I EQUAL(prOd(u,x),prOd(U,~)) 
(GT-16) TEQUAL(U,U) I EQUAL(prOd(x,u),prOd(x,u)) 
(GT-1’7) 7 EQUAL(U,U) I EouAt.(inv(u),inv(u)) 
The cube of every x is the identity e: 
(COM-1) 1 P(X,X,y) I P(y,X,e) 
(COM-2) 1 P(X,X,y) IP(X,y,e) 
Denial of the conclusion: 
(COM-3) P(a,b,c) 
(COM-4) P(c,inv(a),d) 
(COM-5) P(d,inv(b),h) 
(COM-6) P(h,b,j) 
(COM-7) PC j,inv(h),k) 
(COM-8) -, P(k,inv(b),e) 
For the first proof we shall give, we use hyperresolution 1271, a set of demodula- 
tors in the input, and demodulators that are found by the program during its 
search for a proof. The demodulators found by the program are used to back- 
demodulate (rewrite) clauses already present, as well as demodulate clauses 
deduced after the program adjoins these new demodulators. In the following 
proof, the clause numbers are taken directly from the successful proof search. 
PROOF 1 OF THE COMMUTATOR THEOREM 
Closure (totality): 
(PCOM-1) Pky, prod(x,y)) 
Left inverse: 
(PCOM-4) P(inv(x),x,e) 
Right inverse: 
(PCOM-5) P(x,inv(x>,e) 
Associativity: 
(PCOM-6) 7 P(x,y,u) I 1 P(y,z,u) I 1 P(u,z,w) lP(x,u,w) 
(PCOM-7) -I P(x,y,u) I 1 P(Y,z,u) I 1 P(x,u,w) I P(u,z,w) 
Product is well defined: 
(PCOM-11) 1 P(X,y,U> 1 1 P(X,y,U> I EQUAL(U,U) 
Left cancellation: 
(PCOM-18) 1 P(X,U,y) I 1 P(X,U,y) I EQUA&,U) 
(Another form of) the cube of x is e: 
(PCOM-20) P(x, prod(x,x),e) 
Denial of the conclusion: 
(PCOM-21) P(a,b,c) 
(PCOM-22) P(c,inv(a),d) 
(PCOM-24) P(h,b,j) 
(PCOM-25) 7 P(k,inv(b),e) 
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Demodulators: 
(PCOM-27) EQUALS prod(e,x),x) 
(PCOM-28) EQUALS prod(x,e),x) 
(PCOM-31) ~~~~~(prod(prod(x,y),z),prod(x,prod(y,z))) 
(PCOM-37) ~~~~~(prod(u,b),c) 
(PCOM-40) EQUAL(prOd(h,b),d) 
(PCOM-41) EQUALS prod(d,inv(h)),k) 
From clauses 21, 6, 1, and 1, 
(PCOM-42) Ha, prod(b,x), prod(c,xN 
From clauses 21, 6, 4, and 1, with demodulation by 27, 
(PCOM-48) P(inv(a),c,b) 
From clauses 24, 11, and 1, with demodulation by 40, 
(PCOM-58) EQUAL(d, j> 
From clause 58 back-demodulating clause 41, 
(PCOM-68) EQUAL(prOd( j,inV(h)),k) 
From clause 58 back-demodulating clause 22, 
(PCOM-70) P(c,inv(a), j> 
From cIauses 48, 11, and 1, 
(PCOM-104) EQUAL(prOd(inv(U>,C>,b) 
From clauses 70, 7, 4, and 1, with demodulation by 28, 
(PCOM-137) P( j,u,c> 
From clauses 70, 6, 21, and 1, 
(PCOM-147) P(a,prod(b,inv(u)),j) 
From clauses 20, 6, 1, and 1, with demodulation by 27 and 31, 
(PCOM-190) P(x, prod(x, prod(x,yN,y) 
From clauses 20, 18, and 5, 
(PCOM-199) EQUAL(inV(X), prod(x,x)) 
From clauses 20, 6, 24, and 1, 
(PCOM-211) P(h, prod(b, prod( j,j>>,e> 
From clauses 20, 6, 137, and 1, 
(PCOM-213) P( j, prod(u, prod(c,c)),e) 
From clause 199 back-demodulating clause 147, 
(PCOM-224) Ha, prod@, prod(u,u)), j) 
From clause 199 back-demodulating clause 104, with demodulation by 31, 
(PCOM-241) EQuAL(prod(u, prod(u,cN,b) 
From clause 199 back-demodulating clause 48, 
(PCOM-242) P(prod(a,u),c,b) 
From clause 199 back-demodulating clause 26, 
(PCOM-265) 7 P(k,prod(b,b),e) 
From clause 199 back-demodulating clause 68, 
(PCOM-285) EQuAL(prod(j, prod(h,hN,k) 
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From clauses 242, 6, 1, and 1, 
(PCOM-375) Ha, prod(a,c),b) 
From clauses 42, 11, and 1, 
(PCOM-498) EQuAL(prod(a, prod(b,x)), prod(c,x)) 
From clauses 211, 18, and 20, 
(PCOM-1092) EQuAL(prod(b, prod( j, j)>, prod(h,h)) 
From clauses 213, 18, and 20, 
(PCOM-1117) EQuAL(prod(a, prod(c,c)), prod( j,j)) 
From clauses 224, 7, 190, and 375, with demodulation by 31, 31, 241, 37, 31, 31, 
498, 1117, and 1092, 
(PCOM-1161) P( j, prod(h,h),b) 
From clauses 1161, 11, and 1, with demodulation by 285, 
(PCOM-1214) EQUAL@&) 
From clause 1214 back-demodulating clause 265 twice, 
(PCOM-1589) T P(k, prod(k,k),e) 
Clause (PCOM-1589) contradicts clause (PCOM-20), and the proof is complete. 
0 
For experiments that produce proofs like the preceding and like the following, 
we prefer to employ some or all of the following clauses as demodulators. This set 
of ten clauses is a complete set of reductions for group theory-more accurately, 
for free groups (see Chapter 5 of 1351). For the theorem under discussion, we used 
the first seven only: 
EQUAL(prOd(e,x),X) 
EQUAL(prOd(x,e),x) 
EQuAL(prod(inv(x),x),e) 
EQuAL(prod(x,inv(x)),e) 
EQuAL(prod(prod(x,y),z),prod(x, prod(y,z))) 
EQuAL(inv(inv(x)),x) 
EQuAL(inv(e),e) 
EQUAL(inv(prOd(X,y)), prod(inv(y),inv(x))) 
EQUAL(prOd(inv(X), prod(x,y)),y) 
EQUAL(prOd(X, prod(inv(x), Y ),Y 1) 
Let US stay with the commutator theorem just a bit longer to show how it can be 
proved by using paramodulation and an equality-oriented notation. To study 
abstract group theory, but with an emphasis on the use of equality, one can use the 
following clauses: 
Left identity: 
(GTEQ-1) EQuAL(prOd(e,X),X> 
Right identity: 
(GTEQ-2) EQuAL(prOd(x,e),x) 
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Left inverse: 
(GTEQ-3) EouAL(prod(inv(x),x),e) 
Right inverse: 
(GTEQ4) EQUAL(prOd(x,inv(x)),e) 
Associativity: 
(GTEQJ) EQUAL(prOd(prOd(x,y),Z),prod(x,prod(y,z))) 
Reflexivity: 
(GTEQ-6) EQUAL(X,X) 
One might note that-as expected-the only axiom for equality itself that we 
include is that for reflexivity. 
To have an automated theorem-proving program attempt to prove the commu- 
tator theorem, one can add the following clauses: 
The cube of every x is the identity e: 
(COMEQ-1) EQUAL(prOd(X, prod(x,x)),e) 
Definition of commutator: 
(COMEQ-2) EouAL(com(x,y), prod(x, prod(y,prod(intix),inv( y))))) 
Denial of the conclusion: 
(COMEQ-3) 7 EouAL(com(com(a,b),b),e) 
So that one can study how paramodulation works on a hard problem, so that 
one can see how effective this inference rule is, and so that one can measure one’s 
experiments against what we have obtained, we give the following proof based on 
paramodulation. We use as input demodulators the same seven we used for the 
P-formulation. 
PROOF 2 OF THE COMMUTATOR THEOREM 
Associativity: 
(PCOMEQ-5) EQUAL(prOd(prOd(X,Y ) Z), prochx, prod( y,zN 
Provable lemma in group theory: 
(PCOMEQ-8) EouAL(inv(prod(x, y)), prod(inv( y), i&x))) 
Provable lemma in group theory: 
(PCOMEQ-10) EauAL(prod(inv(x), prod(x,y>),y> 
Reflexivity: 
(PCOMEQ-11) EQUAL(X,X) 
The cube of x is the identity e: 
(PCOMEQ-12) EouAL(prod(x,prod(x,x)),e) 
Denial of the conclusion, after demodulation with definition of commutator: 
(PCOMEQ-13) 7 EauAL(prod(a, prod(b, prod(inv(a), prod(b, prod(a, 
prod(inv(b), prod(inv(u),inv(b)))))))),e) 
Demodulators: 
(PCOMEQ-14) EQUAL(prOd(e,X),X) 
(PCOMEQ-15) EQUAL(prOd(X,e),X) 
(PCOMEQ-18) EouAL(prod(prod(x,y),z), prod(x, prod(y,z))) 
From clause 12 into clause 5, with demodulation by 18, 18, and 18, 
(PCOMEQ-24) EouAL(prod(x, prod( y, prod(x, prod(y, prod(x,y))))),e) 
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From clause 12 into clause 5, with demodulation by 18 and 14, 
(PCOMEQ-28) EQUAL(prOd(X, prod(x, prod(x,y))),y) 
From clause 27 into clause 8, with demodulation by 27, 18, 27, and 18, 
(PCOMEQ-30) EQUAL(prOd(X, prod(x, prod( y,y))), prod( y, prod(x, 
prod(y,xN)) 
From clause 27 into clause 13, with demodulation by 27, 27, 18, 27, 18, 18, 30, 
and 28, 
(PCOMEQ-31) T EouAL(prod(u, prod@, prod(a, prod(a, prod(b, 
prod(a, prod(a, prod(b,a)))))))),e) 
From clause 24 into clause 5, with demodulation by 18, 18, and 18, 
(PCOMEQ-33) EQUAL(prOd(X, prod( y, prod(z, prod(x, prod( y, prod(z, 
prod(x, prod(y,z)))))))),e) 
From clause 33 back-demodulating clause 31, 
(PCOMEQ-35) 7 EQUAL(e,e) 
Clause (PCOMEQ-35) contradicts clause (PCOMEQ-111, and the proof is 
complete. 0 
One who enjoys historical highlights might find it interesting to note that 
reading in 1970 about this problem and its binary resolution and paramodulation 
proofs (obtained by hand) motivated R. Overbeek to become interested in auto- 
mated theorem proving. Overbeek obtained a computer proof with hyperresolution 
in 1975, a proof requiring 100 CPU seconds on an IBM 370/195 with a program he 
designed and implemented. With that same program on the same computer, its 
proof was obtained with paramodulation in 1976 in less than 3 CPU seconds. 
A study of the two given proofs, or an attempt to obtain one of them, may 
amply demonstrate why automated theorem proving relies heavily on the use of 
the set of support strategy, demodulation, and subsumption. The study or the 
attempt may also provide one with excitement and a challenge. Regardless of the 
outcome, theorems like the commutator theorem provide, directly and indirectly, 
excellent illustrations of some of the fundamental differences between logic 
programming and automated theorem proving. Nevertheless, each field offers the 
other many important ideas to consider and techniques to adapt (discussed in 
Section 4), and a good case can be made for the existence of a natural symbiosis. 
Having completed our lengthy review of automated theorem proving, having 
made certain comparisons with logic programming, and desiring to focus on that 
possible symbiosis, let us now turn to collecting some of the important similarities 
and some of the important differences between the two fields. This action will set 
the stage for discussing the possible benefits each field offers the other, which is 
the topic of Section 4. 
3. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Although in some sense it may seem odd to compare logic programming and 
automated theorem proving-since they address fundamentally different issues, 
namely, programming language versus general-purpose deduction-nevertheless, 
we find such a comparison of interest. In particular, especially for those who are 
new to logic programming and automated theorem proving, the comparison may 
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remove certain points of confusion regarding the possible use of the former for the 
latter. 
The most obvious similarity between logic programming and automated theo- 
rem proving-at least, if one focuses on the clause language paradigm-is the 
language that one uses to communicate a problem. Of course, the syntax may vary, 
and most dialects of logic programming require the use of Horn clauses. Neverthe- 
less, both fields rely on the use of clauses. In automated theorem proving, however, 
some programs honor a “built-in” treatment of equality in the full sense of the 
term. For example, use of the predicate EQUAL causes such programs to “know” 
that the corresponding statement refers to equality. Because of our obvious vested 
interest, we are delighted that familiarity with logic programming is rapidly 
growing, so that eventually the vast majority of computer scientists will know what 
a clause is. Such knowledge will increase the likelihood of computer scientists 
using an automated theorem-proving program. 
The second important similarity between logic programming and automated 
theorem proving rests with the fact that the type of reasoning employed by the 
former is one of the types that can be employed by the latter. That reasoning, at 
the top level, as we discussed in Section 2.2.3, corresponds to linked hyperresolu- 
tion. At the lower level, every reasoning step of each path that solves a subgoal is a 
successful application of binary resolution. 
In addition to sharing certain aspects of representation and inference rule, logic 
programming and automated theorem proving share certain aspects of the use of 
strategy. Specifically, both rely heavily on the use of the set of support strategy (see 
Section 2.3). However, logic programming uses a very restricted version of this 
strategy. 
Finally, in the sense discussed in Section 2.6, both fields rely on proof by 
contradiction. Further, just as logic programming constructs or discovers the 
particular object or objects of concern, automated theorem proving can do the 
same by using the ANSWER literal. Of course-to be precise-logic programming 
in effect uses such a literal by its employment of the goal clause. In contrast, 
automated theorem proving, when desired, explicitly uses the ANSWER literal 
whose arguments, upon completion of the given assignment, contain the sought- 
after information. 
With regard to the differences between logic programming and automated 
theorem proving, at least four crucial ones immediately come to mind, and a 
number of lesser ones can be given. First-in the typical approach-logic pro- 
gramming restricts representation by requiring that all clauses but the goal clause 
contain exactly one positive literal. This restriction is a tightening of that which 
asks for all clauses to be Horn clauses, clauses that contain no more than one 
positive literal. In automated theorem proving, no restriction is placed on the 
clauses to be used in presenting a question or a problem. 
Second, in logic programming-and in theorem-proving based on a similar 
paradigm, for example [291--no new clauses are retained during an attack on a 
question or problem. This lack of retention clearly is one important source of the 
impressive speed offered by this programming language. Automated theorem 
proving, on the other hand (with the exception of the program already mentioned 
and similar ones) relies heavily on the retention of new information. Although such 
retention (when all other considerations are ignored) can be expensive, we conjec- 
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ture that, especially for deep questions and hard problems, it is absolutely 
necessary for effectiveness: a point we address in Section 2.2.3. In fact, for those 
who doubt this necessity, we shall give some challenge problems in Section 5, in 
addition to our recommendation of attempting to prove the commutator theorem. 
The third important difference focuses on the use of strategy. Although logic 
programming-as we have observed-does use strategy, its use is extremely 
limited in comparison with the rich and sophisticated use of strategy in automated 
theorem proving. Though the limitation of logic programming to a single search 
strategy contributes to performance (even more than avoiding the occurs check 
does), to confine the use of strategy to a depth-first and left-to-right search and to 
a very limited form of the set of support strategy appears to us to cheat logic 
programming of much of its potential. Indeed, for logic programming to dramati- 
cally widen its scope of application to include the consideration of deep questions 
from mathematics, we conjecture that a far more sophisticated use of strategy is 
required. For one example, logic programming might consider using a broader 
form of the set of support strategy (as discussed in Section 2.3). For a second 
example, giving logic programming access to a strategy such as the weighting 
strategy, which allows the user to give hints about what is important, also appears 
to us to be a move that would add to the effectiveness of logic programming. After 
all, since the intent in logic programming is to enable one to apply an algorithm 
and in the context of logical reasoning, it seems natural to also permit the user to 
give hints. 
The fourth significant difference between logic programming and automated 
theorem proving is in‘their treatments of equality in its fullest meaning. From what 
we know, no satisfactory and fully general treatment currently exists in logic 
programming. If this is the case, an outside observer should understand why, for 
the obstacles presented by equality are clearly most formidable. Indeed, although 
we are very partial to the treatment given to equality by the use of the inference 
rule paramodulation, we openly recognize that this inference rule does not by itself 
solve all of the problems that accompany a natural treatment of equality. As a 
result, we are still actively searching for ever more powerful strategies to control 
the application of paramodulation. 
In contrast to using paramodulation, logic programming-to study formal 
semantics-has considered building equality into unification [8], more or less in 
the style of E-resolution [20]. Such an approach, which goes even further than 
using associative/commutative unification, has actually been tried in automated 
theorem proving, and the practical results are very disappointing. A number of 
researchers in logic programming would in fact have predicted such an outcome, 
believing that building equality into unification has little practical value. 
Given these observations, we conjecture that logic programming, to fulfill its 
potential, must address equality directly and in its full generality, either by using a 
form of paramodulation or by some other means. 
Among the other noteworthy differences is the absence of the occurs check in 
most of logic programming, in contrast to its constant presence in automated 
theorem proving. We do understand and accept that its absence contributes in an 
important way to the excellent speed that is offered, but offering the option-not 
requirement- of using the occurs check seems to merit serious consideration. 
Other differences worth mentioning regard the use, in automated theorem proving, 
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of demodulation to produce canonical forms for information and the use of 
subsumption to remove information captured by more powerful statements. Of 
course, neither of these procedures is relevant when no new information is 
retained. 
Finally, in the strictest sense-with the exceptions concerning deductive 
databases, expert systems, and limited aspects of theorem proving-logic program- 
ming is a programming language, designed to efficiently execute well-tuned algo- 
rithms, especially those in which logical reasoning plays an important role. In 
contrast, an automated theorem-proving program is a collection of procedures 
that, taken together, form a reasoning system designed to attack problems for 
which one does not know of an effective algorithm to apply. Unfortunately, the 
danger exists of confusing the two: logic programming and automated theorem 
proving. 
In particular, one should not attempt to take a shortcut to producing a system 
with the needed power offered by some theorem-proving programs-a shortcut of 
the form in which a small modification is made to logic programming, or one 
inference rule is adjoined. After all, if one considers how impressively mathemati- 
cians and logicians apply logical reasoning to questions and problems, one should 
expect that no shortcut exists to producing a computer program that can compete 
with such powerful minds or that can be used to significantly assist such minds. For 
example-and we borrow from experience as poker players-simple strategies 
produce small results. Continuing with the analogy, if one’s play is governed solely 
by the probabilities that can be found in the appropriate tables, then one will win 
at poker only if the other players are very weak. The other players in the game of 
science-the open questions to answer and problems to solve-are not very weak; 
to win in a contest with them, heavy use of strategy-as well as other complex 
procedures-is required. In addition to our total conviction concerning the need 
to use strategy, w,e also strongly favor a computer-oriented approach to automated 
theorem proving-in contrast to a person-oriented approach that attempts, for 
example, to emulate some great mathematician. 
However, despite our comments that some-unfortunately-might consider 
negative, we are convinced that each of the two fields, logic programming and 
automated theorem proving, offers the other a great deal. Therefore, let us now 
turn to that topic, and to the symbiosis that could exist-and, in fact, already does 
in part exist. 
4. SYMBIOSIS: BENEFITS EACH FIELD OFFERS THE OTHER 
As the titles of this article and section suggest, we conjecture that the two fields of 
automated theorem proving and logic programming, even more than complement- 
ing each other, offer each other various important features-to the point that a 
possible symbiosis exists. We shall be content with merely sampling what is 
possible, since we have made corresponding observations throughout this article. 
With regard to a general way in which logic programming complements auto- 
mated theorem proving, there exist many problems with the property that certain 
aspects of an attack on them should be treated algorithmically, while other aspects 
cannot. For example, in program verification and, even more so, in Godel’s finite 
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axiomatization of set theory (see Chapter 6 of [351), certain literals in various input 
and various deduced clauses have the property that they are shared. Of these 
literals, many correspond to conditions that must be checked routinely to see if 
they are satisfied. One promising approach to increasing the effectiveness of an 
automated theorem-proving program would have logic programming address the 
removal of these literals in an algorithmic manner while the theorem-proving 
program itself applies the general, less focused reasoning to the remaining literals. 
As evidence that supports the feasibility of such an approach-although we in no 
way recommend the imitation of the way people solve problems-consideration of 
various proofs produced by a person (in contrast to those produced by a computer) 
suggests that some of what occurs is indeed algorithmic, but most of it cannot be 
treated algorithmically. 
For an example of a more specific benefit logic programming offers to auto- 
mated theorem proving (and here we draw on one of the implementation tech- 
niques found in OITER, our newest theorem-proving program), demodulation can 
be far less expensive in CPU time if, instead of the commonly used approach of 
applying substitutions and copying clauses, one replaces those two operations with 
the manipulation of pointers, as occurs in logic programming. For an example 
based on conjecture, various resolution-based linked inference rules might be 
implemented by compiling the linking clauses and nuclei in the way that logic 
programs are compiled; the result might indeed offer one or two orders of 
magnitude faster execution. For examples of using logic programming technology 
as the basis for automated theorem proving in general, one might study the work 
of Stickel [29] or the work of Plaisted [24]. 
With regard to possible benefits that automated theorem proving offers logic 
programming-and, as expected, we can and do say more on this topic, for this is 
our field of expertise-two main areas merit investigation. The first, the treatment 
of equality, must be addressed in its fullest if logic programming is to fulfill the 
vision of its zealots (which in no way implies that this programming language is 
anything but impressive). Obviously, equality plays such a vital role in so many 
questions and problems that a means must be found to more than adequately cope 
with the obstacles equality presents. Perhaps a study of how equality is treated in 
the clause language paradigm-specifically, the ways discussed in Sections 2.2.2 
and 2.4-will provide a clue, or even provide the key. 
Our preference-as we have made abundantly clear-is to use the inference 
rule paramodulation. As evidence of its power, we cite our most recent successes 
in combinatory logic [19,371. Paramodulation, in addition to generalizing the usual 
notion of equality substitution, also permits a program to reason deep within 
nested expressions directly. Although logic programming often appears reluctant 
to use nested expressions (except, of course, where the expressions can be treated 
algorithmically and where equality is avoided), if one wishes to attack open 
questions and hard problems, one must expect to encounter deeply nested expres- 
sions. For equational programming and for a combination of equational and logic 
programming, certain aspects of paramodulation have already been proposed [S]. 
The second area of automated theorem proving whose study might offer 
researchers in logic programming substantial reward is that concerning the use of 
various types of strategy. As discussed in Section 2.3, the set of support strategy 
can be used to restrict the reasoning to conclusions that are recursively traceable 
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to the information chosen to support the entire investigation, and the weighting 
strategy can be used to direct reasoning by permitting the user to play an active 
advice-giving role. In addition to other existing strategies that might be of use, 
perhaps researchers in logic programming can formulate new ones. If so, then 
researchers and implementors in automated theorem proving must examine the 
new results. 
In other words, although our treatment is perhaps too brief, strong evidence 
exists for the position that the two fields complement each other. Even further, 
strong evidence exists that-even more than at the implementation level-the two 
fields offer each other ideas to consider, enough ideas to suggest hat symbiosis 
between automated theorem proving and logic programming does exist. 
5. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS-AND CHALLENGES 
Before turning to our conclusions and recommendations we close on a high 
note-suspecting that most researchers enjoy challenges-by presenting the fol- 
lowing questions for logic programming and also for automated theorem proving. 
Let the set P consist of two combinators B and N which, respectively, satisfy the 
following two equations: 
((NX)Y)Z = ((XZ)Y)Z. 
The first two challenge questions ask whether the set P satisfies the weak or the 
strong fixed-point property. 
Definition. Where P is a given set of combinators, the weak fired-point property 
holds for P if and only if for all combinators x there exists a combinator y such 
that y =xy, where y is expressed purely in terms of the combinators in P and 
the variable X. 
Definition. Where P is a given set of combinators, the strong jixed-point property 
holds for P if and only if there exists a combinator y such that, for all 
combinators X, yx = x( yx), where y is expressed purely in terms of combinators 
in P. 
In clause form, we can use 
lEQUAL(Y,a(f,Y)) 
to deny that the weak fixed-point property holds, and we can use 
lEQuAL(a(Y,g(Y)),a(g(Y),a(Y,g(Y)))) 
to deny that the strong fixed-point property holds, where f is a Skolem constant, 
and g is a Skolem function. 
Since we know the answers to these two questions (see 13711, and since one 
might prefer an open question to study, let us consider the set P’ consisting of the 
two combinators B and S, where 
((Sx)y)z= (XZ)(YZ). 
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The third and fourth challenge questions ask whether P’ satisfies the weak or the 
strong fixed-point property. 
Since we have kept our promise concerning challenges by giving four questions 
to consider-noting that many research questions focusing directly on automated 
theorem proving can be found in [35]-let us next turn to our view of the present 
and the future. We are more optimistic now than at any other time since 1963, 
when we first became interested in the automation of logical reasoning (the term 
automated reasoning was not introduced until seventeen years later). The advent 
of parallelism, the design of new theorem-proving programs such as OTTER, the 
occurrence of numerous advances in logic programming and in automated theorem 
proving, all tell the same story. The future is indeed bright, and the opportunities 
to contribute in a significant way are greater than at any time in the history of 
either field. Therefore, we recommend that, although the amount of experimenta- 
tion is substantially greater than it was even five years ago, far more experiments 
be conducted. 
We also recommend that researchers in logic programming strongly consider 
offering users some or all of the options we have discussed in this article, among 
which are the use of a variety of strategies, a built-in and practical treatment of 
equality, and access to using the occurs check by setting a flag. We even suggest 
that, since we wish to encourage the use of natural representation within the 
clause language paradigm, the restriction to Horn clauses be relaxed. Indeed, as 
we have been told by F. Pereira 1221, such a relaxation would be of substantial 
value to those interested in language parsing and language translation. Obviously, 
we wish to encourage the corresponding difficult but potentially significant re- 
search focusing on the variety of topics discussed in this article, and-taking a big 
chance-we predict that many extensions of the type we have discussed will exist 
shortly. 
Of the various options discussed in this article, we note that the occurs check 
must be offered-or some other guarantee of the soundness of the reasoning be 
given-if logic programming is to be used as a deductive system. Although all 
researchers in logic programming are fully aware of the potential for drawing an 
unsound conclusion, we were startled at how easy it was to construct the following 
entertaining example illustrating the need for the occurs check. First, one is given 
the assertion that for all x there exists a y with x less than y. Then, unexpectedly, 
one is asked to prove that there exists an x such that for all y, y is less than X. For 
the first of the two statements, one can use the clause 
and for the second, when assumed false, one can use the clause 
7 LESSTHAN( g(X) ,X) , 
where f and g are appropriate Skolem functions. Given these two clauses-if the 
occurs check is ignored-a program will decide that a proof by contradiction has 
been found. Unfortunately, such a discovery proves that the existence of ever 
larger integers-which almost everyone accepts as true-implies the existence of a 
largest integer (even larger than itself), which many people doubt. 
To close this section (and we are concerned that the observations we are about 
to repeat may disappoint or, worse, may annoy too many people), certain positions 
must be challenged, and challenged strongly. The most difficult for us to challenge 
-difficult because we have such great respect for some who hold the 
position-concerns a particular class of paradigm for automated theorem proving. 
Succinctly stated, we conjecture that one cannot design and implement an auto- 
mated theorem-proving program based on the current paradigms for logic pro- 
gramming, if that program is to be used to attack deep questions or hard problems. 
We are not being self-contradictory, for we do feel that one can profitably borrow 
from logic programming. Our conjecture is based on twenty-five years of experi- 
mentation-we certainly would like to believe that we are not simply being 
old-fashioned-and on our conviction that a sophisticated use of strategy is 
required and the retention of significant clauses is mandatory. We in fact more 
fully addressed this issue in Section 2.3 and in Section 2.2.3, when we discussed the 
need for clause retention and for the use of both demodulation and subsumption. 
The next position we must challenge is that which in effect asserts that small 
modifications or simple fixes will suffice to extend logic programming to a 
theorem-proving program that offers substantial power. The difficulty of interest- 
ing questions from mathematics and logic makes it virtually impossible for such an 
easy and quick solution to work. Also-and here we pay appropriate tribute to 
various system designers-Boyer and Moore, on the one hand, and Overbeek and 
company, on the other, have devoted and are devoting many hundreds of hours to 
the consideration of implementing a very powerful theorem-proving program. 
Researchers of their caliber could not have overlooked such a simple solution to 
the problem of implementation. 
The third and final position we must challenge is that which implies that logic 
programming as it now stands offers sufficient power to attack deep questions and 
solve hard problems. Although we laud the achievements of this field, and 
although we expect to see far more impressive ones in the future, such a position 
is, in most cases, doomed to disappointment. After all, logic programming is 
primarily a programming language, and rwt a deep reasoning system. 
However-hoping that the preceding comments have not caused too many to 
simply cease reading-we again note that the two fields do complement each 
other, and that each potentially offers the other a great deal. Among the offerings 
are certain implementation techniques, a rather pleasing treatment of equality, 
various types of strategy, and far more. For those researchers who prefer a definite 
position concerning which field offers which the most, we conclude from our 
experience that, currently, automated theorem proving offers more to logic pro- 
gramming than the reverse. More important than this comparison is the natural 
symbiosis that exists between the two fields and the pursuit of the common goal of 
an effective automation of logical reasoning. 
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